










Democracies govern in the name of ‘We the People’ and referendums 
appear as the most direct way of involving the people in self-government. 
At the same time referendums carry important risks. Perhaps the most 
sensitive of these efforts to consult ‘We the People’ are precisely in those 
situations where the very identity of the people themselves is in question. 
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Debates about Northern Ireland’s possible 
constitutional futures, and the potential revisioning 
of constitutional relationships on these islands, have 
been brought to a new juncture by developments 
surrounding Brexit. 
TJI work on Northern Ireland’s possible 
constitutional futures is, however, not at all new; it 
has been a longstanding theme of the Institute’s 
scholarship. In the more immediate aftermath of the 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, the constitution-
type quality of the peace agreement itself motivated 
TJI scholarship, as did the novel hybrid of domestic 
and international law norms given constitutional 
expression through the peace agreement. 
In addition, extensive – and ongoing – TJI work has addressed the process, potential 
content and significance of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland and an All-Island Charter of 
Rights. Recent TJI scholarship has examined challenges in reconciling Northern Ireland’s 
devolved status within the UK welfare and rights framework. 
Throughout this scholarship, and in this new phase of constitutional deliberations, 
the TJI has brought two particular contributions to bear: the first is the importance of 
an international and comparative perspective; and the second is the need to ask – 
consistently and persistently – who is or may be excluded from these debates, with 
a particular emphasis on gender inclusion. The Deliberating Constitutional Futures 
workshop, and this report, reflect, embody and substantively advance both of these 
contributions. I commend the report to you.  
Dr Catherine O’Rourke
Director of the Transitional Justice Institute
CONCEPT NOTE
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Democracies govern in the name of ‘We the People’ and referendums appear as the 
most direct way of involving the people in self-government. Amidst fears that the public 
are becoming disenchanted with representative democracy and de-aligned from political 
parties, referendums offer one route to re-engage the people in politics. 
At the same time referendums carry important risks. There are many questions about the 
technical operation of referendums, perhaps especially in a country like the UK lacking 
a codified constitution and tradition of direct democracy. The wording of a referendum 
is vital to get right. And referendums are not necessarily conducive to democratic 
deliberation. The discourse around a referendum may arouse tensions and incite incivility. 
They represent the risk of a majoritarian solution in a context where minorities may 
feel marginalised. 
Perhaps the most sensitive of these efforts to consult ‘We the People’ are precisely in 
those situations where the very identity of the people themselves is in question. 
A possible referendum is part of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement, as part of a 
nuanced package of measures to resolve the protracted conflict in the divided society of 
Northern Ireland. The Agreement recognises the right of the people of Northern Ireland to 
be Irish or British or both and recognises their right to decide whether to remain a part of 
the United Kingdom or to join Ireland. One of the unintended consequences of the UK’s 
2016 Brexit referendum has been to increase the likelihood of such a ‘border poll’. 
The stakes in any such referendum would be high. For the people of Northern Ireland, 
it would mean re-joining the European Union. For Ireland it would imply constitutional 
change. And there is the risk of increased tensions among Northern Ireland’s divided and 
segregated society and possible unrest or violence. 
These issues have a special historical and political resonance in the context of Northern 
Ireland, but they are not uniquely Northern Irish. It is important to reflect on international 
and comparative learning to consider how to conduct a border poll. In particular how 
could a border poll be conducted in a way that encourages deliberation and the genuine 
participation of people across society and across 
the divisions of this society? This workshop 
brings together experts on referendums 
internationally and within the different 
jurisdictions in these islands to reflect on 
the past and prepare for the future.
Rory O’Connell & Eilish Rooney
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INTRODUCTION
The prompt for today’s workshop is the increased 
speculation about a border poll in these jurisdictions. 
Brexit has made this more topical; and we have 
seen different groups such as Constitutional 
Conversations, and the Working Group on 
Unification Referendums on the island of Ireland 
(several members of that group are here today) 
focused on these issues.  Despite a recent survey 
showing only 29% of people in NI support 
re-unification, which is certainly well short of any sort 
of the majority required in the GFA for a border poll, 
it is also the highest that figure has been recorded at.
So, while the main focus may be our own local 
situation, referendums are not uniquely Northern 
Irish, or even Irish; many other countries have 
experience with referendums, and we hope to hear about experiences, thoughts and 
reflections from other parts of these islands.  Referendums are topical and controversial, 
not just on these islands but much further afield.
Eilish and I started planning this event back in September 2019, settling on the date for 
this event quite early on.  We did not envisage at that time there would be an early UK 
General Election, approval of the UK Withdrawal Agreement, the return of Stormont, or the 
Irish General Election, never mind the results of the Irish General Election. 
So, let me thank Eilish for the inspiration for this Workshop, and for her practical work in its 
organisation of this workshop, as well as Sadie Magee, who provided the administrative 
support and helped us with travel and accommodation. 
The purpose of the workshop is to encourage discussion and exchanges, involving as 
many in the audience as possible. In response to a question for the workshop participants, 
starting off, this interactive slide displayed the comments: (see next page).
Rory O’Connell
Despite a recent survey showing only 29% of people in NI 
support re-unification, which is certainly well short of any 
sort of the majority required in the GFA for a border poll, 
it is also the highest that figure has been recorded at.
“
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PANEL 1: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON REFERENDUMS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Prof Aoife O’Donoghue, Law School, Durham University 
Chair: Prof Brice Dickson, School of Law, Queen’s University of Belfast
Prof Rory O’Connell, School of Law and Transitional Justice Institute, Ulster University
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PRESENTATION 1: 
DELIBERATING CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURES
Prof Aoife O’Donoghue, Law School, Durham University
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I am approaching this from two perspectives;  firstly,  from a doctrinal international law 
perspective,  which won’t cover the international human rights elements; and from 
a second perspective, I will talk about what feminist referendums are, what feminist 
deliberation is and how feminist discourse, connected to other work I am doing, is related 
to the questions posed here.
The first thing to say about international law is that it pays little attention to democracy, 
but a huge amount to sovereignty.  Democracy is not a definition of statehood, but 
sovereignty very much is. 
There are a range of European Reports, examples and treaties but these form part of 
regional customary international law and may be regarded as not yet binding within 
broader international law.  There is Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), but these are on electoral law and on elections, and how you 
follow them; they give very useful pointers as to what should happen, but on democracy 
not so much.  There are also international organisations with some practice like the 
European Union, which establishes some strong practice.  The Commonwealth used to 
care [about how governments are elected], but no longer pays much attention; the African 
Union increasingly is getting involved with whether or not governments are democratically 
elected.  
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That brings us to another issue within international law, that is the recognition of 
governments, which, as we can see with Venezuela, has had a huge comeback.  
Recognising governments is much more tied to questions around democracy and 
deliberations, and “thick” ideas about democracy, but this may be limited to Venezuela 
and power plays.
Of course, we have the right to self-determination, but I would argue that self-
determination, beyond the very structured UN process of decolonisation, is very rarely 
legal until after the fact.  It is very hard to argue that you have, say, a remedial right to 
self-determination, as Catalonia demonstrates pretty well. It is very hard to meet that 
barrier, because it is so narrowly construed.  A vote for self-determination and territorial 
changes doesn’t mean you get new states or you get reunification. The vote on the Good 
Friday Agreement (GFA), or devolution in Scotland and Wales were all exercises in self-
determination, within that broad definition. 
Referenda can be nonbinding, e.g. as happened in Bougainville, where there was an 
overwhelming vote for independence, but nearby states said they would not recognise 
it.  It wasn’t ever going to be a binding referendum. There you had a well-run referendum, 
according to Bertie Ahern who acted as an observer, a lot of debate and engagement, 
but other nearby states, e.g. Australia, didn’t recognise it.  So, even if you do fulfil all the 
criteria, just because you have run a referendum democratically doesn’t necessarily mean 
anything when it comes to statehood and sovereignty. 
The ties to the 19th century are all-important when you are thinking about context.  There 
are many complicated examples of countries across Europe breaking up and reforming, 
and they all tend to be different. There tends to be a lot of variety, and a part of this is the 
question of sovereignty, and particularly who is sovereign.  This is going to become very 
important here [in NI] for example because you also have UK Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
Who is sovereign? Is it the people?  If it’s the people, and you have that problem of 
reconstituting yourself, of recreating yourself, then that is very much tied to democracy. 
As soon as democracy gets tied into sovereignty and the people, international law backs 
off again. International law does not care who is sovereign within a particular state.
The Good Friday/Belfast Agreement settled some of those questions; it did pick the group 
of people who would be voting, but I will come back to that question. 
Going back to the 18th century, referendums on territory are the most common referenda. 
Territorial changes globally are the most common, and you would think there’d be a lot of 
practice to look at, but there isn’t.  As Crimea demonstrates, holding a referendum in and 
of itself does not mean it’s democratic, or that everyone will accept it, and Bougainville 
is another good example.  What standards there are, and what standards have to be met 
to be accepted, are not part of customary international law to any great extent.  You can 
have undemocratic referenda; you can also have referenda that are absent of any thick 
conception of democracy. 
There are constitutional restrictions on who can vote, e.g. in the GFA, a unionist living 
in the south, asylum seekers living in direct provision, or a citizen of Ireland living in the 
north, not a citizen of Northern Ireland, would not get a vote.  So, who we are we talking 
about when we are talking about sovereign will becomes important. 
Again, if we are talking about a thick idea of democracy, who is involved in the 
deliberations, who is involved in the debates?  International law does not have any 
requirement for deliberations or of thick democracy. It raises questions about whether 
populations are well suited for the task? Anti-referendum sentiment often gets thrown in 
with fears of majoritarianism and majority tyranny. But you never get a fear of the minority, 
and by minority here I mean the minority elite, not minorities in a rights context, the 
powerful within a state, the decision makers.  There is rarely a fear of what they might do; 
there is a fear of what the people might want to do but rarely a fear of what a minority elite 
might choose to do.
In the Republic, there is also a fear of reconstituting, reimagining; a clasping on to the 
Constitution and what it means, a kind of hagiography that exists around documents. 
It reflects a conservative tendency, which also applies to the Good Friday Agreement, 
a document that for very good reasons people don’t want to tamper with; but then you 
get a document that gets elevated above contestation and debate.  I’m with Thomas 
Paine in believing every generation is as capable as the next generation about writing 
constitutional documents.
When we think about who is well suited, if we think that people are sovereign, or 
parliament is sovereign, all those questions are tied together, and if we don’t think the 
people are suitable who do we think are suitable? Why do we think that group?
10  |  DELIBERATING CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURES
DELIBERATING CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURES  |  11
Working with Colin Murray on a project ‘Performing Identities’, we came up with three 
models.  Our concern with a model is with the question of who or what group of people 
should be making decisions.  Model 1 is a straightforward very simple model, but in that 
process, you are likely to have lots of discussion and lots of debate. So, who are we 
talking to?
In another project I’m doing with Mairead Enright, Catherine O’Rourke and Liam Thornton 
in Dublin, carrying on from the NI Feminist Judgements Project, we are talking about 
rewriting constitutional documents from a feminist perspective. We had a workshop where 
we looked at Article 41.2 which is the article that rarefies the woman in the home , and we 
deliberately had very few lawyers in the room; we mainly had activists and artists and they 
were more than capable of discussing all the issues we raised; and they were very good 
at producing excellent text that was extremely pertinent, important and well thought out.  
The lawyers were there but didn’t get involved.  The point was to see how people would 
get on.  The women questioned their own expertise and ability to tackle legal texts and 
drafting, but once they realised they did have the expertise they were more than capable 
of deliberating and drafting.
That idea of expertise – who deliberates and who gets involved in all of these moments is 
really important.  Who gets engaged? Who gets to talk about it?  What kind of Ireland do 
we want if we were going down this path?
Expert legal capture is really important here; as lawyers we know what things mean, we 
know what words say, we know how to draft the words but we are innately a conservative 
group of people, even those of us who don’t think we’re conservative, because Law is an 
innately conservative discipline.             
Does it have to be lawyers?
What is desperately needed in all of this debate about a new Ireland is IMAGINATION.
Does anyone ask travellers what they would like; all the refugees and asylum seekers who 
have come to Ireland over the past 10 years, has anyone asked them what a new Ireland 
would look like?
International law won’t get you anywhere, and where it does it pushes you into very 
conservative tendencies. Rather than have all expert led discussions, perhaps it’s an 
opportunity to have a bit of imagination – actually talk to everybody.
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PRESENTATION 2: 
WHAT HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS HAVE 
TO SAY ABOUT REFERENDUMS
Prof Rory O’Connell, Transitional Justice Institute and Law School, Ulster University
Referendums and International Law
This paper highlights the international law standards focusing on the conduct of 
referendums, drawing especially on Council of Europe sources and the UN’s International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
There is an important point of discussion in relation to referendums, border polls and the 
people’s right to self-determine. This people’s right is found in the common article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). My focus though is more on the political 
participation rights which we find in article 25 ICCPR. 
The paper considers what might be gleaned first from hard law standards at European 
and international level and then, more fruitfully perhaps from the soft law standards at 
European level. 
First though the starting point for any human rights lawyer in these islands must be the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).
Hard Law I The European Convention and European Court of Human Rights. 
A number of rights are relevant here or might be thought to be relevant. These include the 
core political rights of free expression and association, right to non-discrimination, and the 
right to free elections. 
Turning to the latter the right to free elections is found in article 3 of the First Protocol to 
the ECHR (P1-3). 
The text of this article suggests that it is primarily concerned with the obligation to hold 
free elections for the legislature. Indeed, at one point it was thought the article did not 
protect the right to vote or to run for election but simply created a duty to hold elections.
The European Commission and Court of Human Rights have clarified that the article 
does include the individual right to vote and the individual right to run for election. The 
Court has also clarified that the rights apply to certain sub-national legislatures, including 
regional councils in Italy, and also to the supranational European Parliament. 
The Court has however set its face against recognising the applicability of the article to 
referendums (or presidential elections).
This is despite being presented with two cases which furnished compelling arguments for 
a change, one from the UK, one from Turkey. 
The UK case was Moohan and Gillon v United Kingdom App nos 22962/15 and 23345/15  
(13 June 2017) and followed from a lengthy discussion of the issue in the UK’s Supreme 
Court where the Supreme Court split 5-2 on whether referendums fell within the scope 
of P1-3. The applicants in Moohan were in prison having been convicted of murder; 
they sought a judicial review of the Franchise Act on a variety of grounds including 
compatibility with ECHR, EU law and common law principles. The 5-judge majority thought 
it was clear that the Convention did not apply to referendums in light of the jurisprudence 
from Strasbourg and the wording of P1-3.
Two judges – Lord Kerr and Wilson dissented. They disputed that the Strasbourg case 
law was as unequivocal as the majority thought, noting in particular the line in an earlier 
UK case (McLean) that there was nothing in the nature of that referendum which brought 
it within scope of P1-3. Lord Kerr noted that the independence referendum involved the 
choice of what entity should be the Scottish legislature. 
In Strasbourg, the Court gave more consideration to the debate than it had hitherto. 
It indicated that the Court and Commission had been lapidary in their discussion precisely 
because the issue was clear-cut (paragraph 40)! The Court dismissed the suggestion 
that there was  anything distinctive about a secession referendum – the institutions had 
after all considered EU accession referendums. The Court explained that the language in 
McLean was intended to cover the possibility that domestic legal language might describe 
a process as a referendum even though it fitted the description in P1-3.
(The Court also dismissed an argument that the issues fell under the heading of the 
right to free expression in Article 10. For the Court when it came to the right to vote, the 
provisions of P1-3 were Lex specialis.)
The Court unusually had to face this question again shortly afterwards in a  case from 
Turkey. This presented perhaps the strongest argument for the Court to extend the scope 
of P1-3. The case concerned the Turkish referendum which sought to change radically 
the parliamentary system of Turkey - the omnibus amendments created a presidential 
system, allowed the president to be politically partisan and even the leader of a political 
party, allow the president to appoint vice presidents; there were also serious issues about 
the context in which the amendment was passed including the fact it was during a state 
of emergency and some members of one opposition party were in jail. The applicants 
alleged irregularities in the counting of the ballots. The referendum was approved by an 
even narrower majority than the Brexit referendum – 51.41% yes and 48.59 % against. 
The Venice Commission had issued a highly critical report on the proposed referendum. 
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In short if ever there was a situation where the Court might decide that a referendum 
process should be brought under the scrutiny of the Court this would likely be it. 
Nevertheless, the Court insisted that its settled case law and the clear wording of the 
provision precluded its application. 
More recently the Court has again rejected a request to look at referendums in the 
context of the Catalan independence referendum, and refused to consider the application 
of P1-3 in the context of an effort by the certain members of the Catalan parliament to 
convene; the Strasbourg Court nevertheless found that P1-3 could not be applied, relying 
in part on the fact domestic Spanish institutions (the Constitutional Court) had suspended 
the relevant Catalan laws. 
Given the steady line of jurisprudence, the ECtHR is unlikely to have anything to say about 
any Irish unity referendums. It is striking that the ECtHR has adopted an approach which 
is closely tied to the text on this question, even though it has adopted an evolving and 
effective interpretation approach on other questions and also even on P1-3. 
The clarity of the ECtHR’s approach makes it unlikely that it would be open to an indirect 
approach availing of the non-discrimination principle in Article 14. The non-discrimination 
principle in Article 14 only applies when a situation is within the ambit of a Convention 
right. Again, this is an area where the ECtHR has generally been somewhat creative but 
given the clarity of the point that referendums are not covered by P1-3 it is unlikely the 
Court would accept an Article 14 claim.
A much more plausible ECHR argument would be based on Protocol 12 which creates a 
free-standing non-discrimination right in respect of any right set forth by law, not just those 
in the ECHR. This free-standing right allows the Court to consider matters that otherwise 
it would not be able to. The most famous example of this is in the realm of political rights 
– in Sejdic and Finci the ECHT considered discriminatory aspects of the voting system for 
the Presidency of Bosnia Herzegovina. 
However, P12 does not apply to this issue. Ireland signed P12 in 2000 but has not yet 
ratified it so it is not binding as a matter of international law, never mind domestic law. 
The UK has not even signed P12 and has longstanding concerns about the scope of P12. 
Hard Law II – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 25 of the ICCPR is the UN’s equivalent of P1-3. It is notable that this is phrased 
much more widely than P1-3 in many ways. In one problematic way it is textually narrow in 
that, unlike most of the ICCPR rights, it is expressly limited to citizens. 
The Human Rights Committee has glossed this language in Article 25 in its own General 
Comment 25. GC25 makes it clear that referendums are covered by Article 25; relevant 
also to our discussions today is that GC 25 is quite strong in terms of requiring positive 
action to encourage everyone’s effective enjoyment of their rights  - so measures should 
be taken to overcome difficulties like illiteracy, language barriers, poverty and so forth 
(para 12).   
Given the difference in language, the Committee has had little difficulty in deciding 
complaints about matters like presidential elections and referendums, though not many 
have come its way. 
The Committee has had some occasion to comment on these issues in its jurisprudence. 
In Gillot v France (15 July 2002, HRC, Communication no. 932/2000), the Committee had 
to consider arrangements for certain referendums in New Caledonia under the Noumea 
Accords. France had adopted distinctive rules on the franchise for different votes in 
this process. 
The 1998 referendum had a franchise requiring a ten-year residence. Subsequently for 
later referendums the franchise was amended to ensure that those persons concerned 
with New Caledonia had a vote. France identified a long list of criteria – being eligible 
to vote in the 1998 referendum for instance or being too young to vote but having been 
continuously resident since then. 
Some 21 applicants argued the rules were discriminatory; they argued there was indirect 
discrimination against citizens of certain ethnicities.  
Notably this did not apply to all voting exercises. 
The Committee applied the test that any distinctions had to be objective and reasonable. 
It also needs to avoid indirect discrimination or justify indirect discrimination. 
16  |  DELIBERATING CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURES
DELIBERATING CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURES  |  17
The Committee did take into consideration that this was part of a self-determination 
process relevant to article 1. The Committee could not consider a complaint as such under 
article 1. It also was notably reticent about defining what was a ‘people’ for the purposes 
of article 1. 
The ICCPR therefore is more relevant in some ways than the ECHR – article 25 applies 
to referendums; there is also a role to be played by article 1, article 2, article 26. And the 
ICCPR is formally binding on both the UK and Ireland, though only Ireland has accepted 
the optional protocol allowing communications (individual complaints); the UK has not 
accepted the optional protocol.   
Soft Law – the Council of Europe
Despite the indifference of the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe 
has devoted considerable attention to issues of referendums. In particular both the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Commission on 
Democracy through Law – more commonly called the Venice Commission – have 
adopted texts in relation to referendums. These do not have the status of legally binding 
international treaties. 
In the early part of the 21st century both PACE and the Venice Commission adopted 
texts on referendums. These included the PACE’s 2005 Recommendation 1704 on 
Referendums and the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Referendums.
As you might imagine, since 2005 – a lot has happened in those fifteen years, especially 
in terms of referendums. Notably Ireland has had a number of referendums of which the 
most high profile have been on abortion and equal marriage; Ireland, along with Italy and 
Switzerland have the most nation-wide referendums of any established democracies. 
Of course, there have also been important examples of referendums in Turkey on 
presidential power, in Hungary and Switzerland in immigration, in Italy, the possibility of 
a referendum on constitutional reform in Russia and referendums in Scotland, Wales and 
two UK wide referendums on the voting system and Brexit. 
This has led to the PACE issuing a report on updating the guidance and the Venice 
Commission is working on revising its Code of Practice. We are fortunate indeed to have 
Dr Alan Renwick in our audience who is one of the persons who advised the rapporteur 
for the PACE committee on the latest issues in relation to referendums. 
There are a few issues which are striking about the guidance in the Code and the latest 
suggestions in the PACE report.
The PACE report suggests referendums should only be used where there is considerable 
public interest but in the context of a Border Poll that is hardly an issue.
The basic rules on the referendum should be set out in advance. The UK in fact has a law 
on Referendums but crucially the franchise is not specified – this can be argued out in 
relation to each referendum. This was a point of discussion in relation to Scotland and the 
Brexit referendum, and one might imagine if the Brexit referendum had a wider franchise 
including for instance the 3 million EU citizens in UK, the nearly 900000 UK citizens 
living in the EU and 16-17 year olds, we have no idea if the same result would have 
been achieved. 
An important recommendation in the Code is that these rules should not be changed 
less than 12 months before the referendum; or if the rules are changed then the changed 
rule should not apply for at least 12 months. The Code and recent PACE report explicitly 
indicates the franchise should be set well in advance (paragraph 52). 
The original code of practice notes on the franchise that nationality requirements may 
apply but ‘it would be advisable for foreigners to be allowed to vote in referendums after 
a certain period of residence’; residence requirements can be imposed but should not be 
more than six months; it is desirable to accord the vote to citizens abroad. 
The latest PACE text draws on the UK’s Independent Commission on Referendums to 
suggest post-legislative referendums may be preferable; the PACE report suggests that 
if this is not possible then the solution may be a two-referendum plan (paragraph 42). 
The Code of Practice and revised PACE text clearly oppose turnout thresholds or quotas 
for approval. Anything other than a majority of voters plus one is problematic. While 
thresholds and quotas may be mechanisms to secure widespread support, there are 
more desirable approaches such as legislative scrutiny, citizen discussion, embedded in 
representative democracy, good quality of information, high levels of participation. 
There are two possible exceptions though – one is where national minorities are 
concerned and the other is in federal systems. 
The revised text from the PACE committee highlights a number of issues where the Venice 
Commission is likely to need to consider specific guidance - this is especially in relation to 
digital and social media and the role of finance. Some of the recommendations may need 
careful consideration in an NI context – the PACE report invites the Venice Commission to 
consider calling for a ban on foreign donations for instance which is not an unproblematic 
suggestion in this jurisdiction. 
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The revised text from the PACE committee also emphasizes to a considerable degree 
the principle that referendums should be incorporated into a system of representative 
democracy and not used by the executive to bypass parliament. 
The revised text - inspired by examples in Ireland, Canada, and elsewhere - stresses the 
need for ‘discussion and deliberation’. 
Concluding Thoughts
In one sense international law – or at least the European Convention on Human Rights 
does not offer very much in the way of guidance. The European Court of Human Rights 
seems to have adopted the view ‘don’t talk to me of referendums’. 
The ICCPR does offer binding law in this area but the level of detail is somewhat lacking 
and as noted only one of the two sovereign states has accepted the relevant complaints 
mechanism. 
The Venice Commission and PACE offer rather more guidance and not least suggest the 
need to get thinking about the legal framework for any such referendum and to have 
it in place well before it becomes an issue. It might be worthwhile involving the Venice 
Commission indeed in giving its opinion on any such legislation or other preparations. 
The main consideration though is that even the more detailed guidance available in soft 
law from the Council of Europe provides at best a framework rather than definite answers 
and in particular the necessarily abstract guidance is unlikely to cover some of the 
perhaps unique circumstances, dare I say particular circumstances of this jurisdiction.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Question 1. On the franchise question: in the Irish context, would Northern Ireland 
resident Irish citizens be able to claim a vote in any Irish referendum?  What prospect do 
you see for a successful complaint through the Optional Protocol in that context?
Rory: what about people for instance born in the Republic of Ireland or Britain, but living 
in Northern Ireland, do they get a vote? 
The text of Art 25 itself starts with the citizen and that’s the default position; section 3 
takes it for granted you can have a citizenship or nationality qualification, but there is an 
argument for a resident’s qualification rather than a nationality qualification. Both systems 
accept that you can impose residence qualifications, as well, subject to scrutiny. As we 
saw in the New Caledonian case, residence can be extremely long, though normally it 
shouldn’t be; a code of good practice specifies a period of six months residence limit 
normally. 
In terms of the possibility for complaints, I suspect that the Human Rights institutions 
accept residence requirements: someone resident in Northern Ireland but who identifies 
as Irish you would expect not to be able to vote in a referendum in the south because of 
residence requirements.  Normally, in election disputes those residence requirements 
seem to be accepted.
There was a big case involving Greece in the European Court of Human Rights, and a 
debate over provision in the Greek constitution, which seemed to anticipate legislation 
to provide for the right to vote of non-resident citizens, where the Court of Human Rights 
ended up reversing itself.  A chamber decided that that meant there should be legislation 
to provide effectively for the right to vote for non-resident Greek citizens.  The grand 
chamber reversed that decision and reaffirmed the broader line of the case law to 
suggest those residence qualifications could be acceptable. 
In Northern Ireland, to what extent does there need to be coordination between 
legislators in the two jurisdictions as to who can vote?  It would be anomalous if an Irish 
citizen in the North could vote in both referendums, for instance, but other people would 
not be able to vote.
Aoife: on a pure public law point, one of the bigger questions is who has the right to self-
determination in a territorial referendum. The GFA gives you an answer there – it is a very 
exclusionary right; it is the people in the territory, who have the right to self-determination, 
they have the right to vote. In territorial referendums there is a need to ask who are the 
people? You can see that in the Scottish referendum debates on Twitter, with people 
saying that everyone in the UK should be able to vote, not just Scotland. 
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Non constitutional referendum v. constitutional referendum: franchises should align; 
a non-constitutional referendum could happen in the republic; or alignment would 
mean breaking free of the wording in the GFA about who exactly has the right to self-
determination. 
Specificity of the idea of ‘the people’;  a footnote in an Annex in the GFA is particularly 
narrow - specifically born here in NI, to a parent of someone born in NI, have to be 
resident in NI – these are the people who have the right to self-determination, and 
following that from an international law perspective, that is the group that has the 
franchise, the right to vote. The group that is given the right to self-determination is clearly 
defined in the GFA and is a highly exclusionary definition; in the south it is just ‘the people 
of Ireland’. The ‘people’ in the republic isn’t defined any further. 
Question 2. The question of the equality of voting rights to residence, the ‘people of 
Northern Ireland’, and the EU and the Common Travel Area.
Aoife: ‘The people of Northern Ireland’ is an example of unintended consequences, 
having been originally annexed to the GFA, and then incorporated into subsequent 
documents. There has been an entrenchment of a definition that was never meant to be 
this kind of legalised definition. 
Common Travel Area: there are constantly questions about this in parliament.  It started off 
as a cure-all, with nebulous connotations, but now everything is being shoe-horned into 
it.  We have ended up with two things that were never intended to have the hard law kind 
of status; the common travel area and ‘the people of Northern Ireland’ are increasingly 
calcified, restraining the choices people have,  and the more they are used for purposes 
they were never intended for, the more problematic they are going to become.  I think the 
Common Travel Area should be codified on a rights basis, because that was what both 
governments were claiming it was.  The UK government have gone down the road of 
defining who are ‘the people’, so it is an extra status symbol and the Irish Government has 
acquiesced to the definition or at least have not protested,  that you are going to give to 
the right people who fit a category, rather than a multiple island where everybody gets to 
access services.
Rory: many of these documents are decided during political processes, then we pick 
them apart years later, as lawyers, and subject them to forensic scrutiny they were never 
intended to bear. 
For instance, the exclusion of British citizens from voting in Irish presidential elections and 
in Irish constitutional referendums. Is there scope to extend the franchise in the south to 
British citizens, to recognise that Irish citizens have had longstanding possibility to vote, to 
participate in all British referendums? Would that be something that, if not constitutionally 
required, might be confidence building measures in the context of the wider discussion?
If we go back to the issue of discrimination between different groups, either because 
of nationality or residence, and the requirement that there be objective and reasonable 
justification; that somebody not born in Northern Ireland may not vote, is that objective? Is 
it reasonable? If you were to look at the way the European Court of Human Rights looks 
at non-discrimination cases, it is fairly formalistic Aristotelian approach to equality; if these 
are different groups of people, so you can treat them differently, might be the easy answer 
for the European Court of Human Rights. Would the Human Rights Committee be willing 
to look at the wider context of Northern Ireland, the long history of the two countries that, 
for better or ill, have been closely involved and whether the ‘people of Northern Ireland’ 
should also include people born in the Republic of Ireland, and for that matter, people 
born in Britain who have longstanding  connections to Northern Ireland? One would hope 
that the more purposive argument would be more successful than the formalist one. 
Question 3. What’s the legal basis for concurrent referendums? 
Aoife: it says ‘concurrent’; it implies that they’re at the same time, but that doesn’t 
necessarily mean they have to be exactly at the same time. You could ask what question 
is being asked at the same time; so you could have two different referendums on different 
kinds of questions first in both, asking different things, and then come together, to vote on 
the same thing, if you knew what that ultimately would look like, all together on the same 
day.  When we have are all being asked the same question, that’s when we would have 
to vote at the same time.  Because, you would not want one vote to influence the other. 
If one side votes one way, and the other votes the other way, that has long term political 
ramification of feelings of hurt and disappointment.  
Question 4. On the franchise, assuming that an agreement would be reached, is there 
a potential problem, in the run up to the actual vote, of processing new applications for 
citizenship (as happened in the 1995 referendum in Quebec)?
Rory: yes, and there is also the question of the Electoral Register; there have been 
longstanding criticisms of the Irish Electoral Register.
Aoife: and extending the vote to 16-year olds in Scotland took time. You’re talking at least 
a year to 18 months if you want to include 16-year olds. 
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Question 5. Underlying principles -need for citizens voters to know what they are voting 
on + inclusivity. Is it simplistic to think these principles can be applied to referendums in 
the context of the future state of Northern Ireland?
 
Rory: We tend to be fairly politicised in Northern Ireland and you can already see that 
all these issues will be debated in terms of our own local differences, and there is 
considerable scope for people to engage in gaming, or spoiling of all of these operations, 
even if intended with all the best faith in the world, in some parts.  There was a border poll 
in Northern Ireland in 1973, when there was something like 98% support for retaining the 
Union with the UK, but that was in the context that nationalists / Catholics overwhelmingly 
boycotted that process. So, I think we can, and we should, and part of the purpose of 
today, think about how we can have consultation and deliberation, in the language of the 
PACE report. But I can see how some people may choose not to be involved in that or 
may adopt stances which undermine parts of it.  We had an all island civic dialogue on 
Brexit, convened by the government in the south, and many unionist politicians did not 
respond to that civic dialogue. Of course, we have to have the principles, the learning 
from exercises in deliberation and consultation in other places, but my gut feeling is that 
it will be politicised and divisive, no matter what is done, and there is scope for gaming 
and spoiling. 
Aoife: The Citizens Assembly was a very interesting process to watch, but it was very 
expert driven, and, this happens with referendums in the south all the time, it got 
obsessed with this idea of neutrality, and lawyers being able to give neutral interpretations 
of law etc. But politics and democracy are more important than law. When it’s rights 
questions and specific, in vote like Repeal, while they are big important questions, they 
are specific, and people are clear about what they are voting for. The Irish model was a 
human rights-based referendum; it wasn’t about potentially creating a whole new country.  
NI is a very politically aware place, and there is considerable scope for gaming, etc.
PANEL 2: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE CONVENTION 
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Chair: Dr Anne Smith, School of Law and Transitional Justice Institute, Ulster University
Dr Conor O’Mahony, Faculty of Law, University College Cork
Dr Jane Suiter, Dublin City University, Director of the Institute for Future Media and 
Journalism (FuJo)
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PRESENTATION 1: 
REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS IRELAND
Conor O’Mahony, Faculty of Law, University College Cork
I am going to speak on the one hand, about our experience of referendum campaigns in 
Ireland and particularly, the legal regulation of referendum campaigns and the dynamics 
they create, and the experience we have had of that; and try to project forward on how 
that might play out in the event that we have a border poll. Informing this is a chapter 
I have just read for a collection I am currently editing called Popular Sovereignty and 
Constitutional Change, which will be published by Routledge later this year. There is a 
very good chapter in that by David Kenny who has written about the idea of referendum 
culture in Ireland, and that is going to be a big theme in what I am going to talk about. 
We developed a certain culture, a certain way of doing things in referendums in Ireland, 
for good or for ill. It’s not perfect, and I’m not claiming that, but nevertheless it is pretty 
embedded, and people have certain expectations and habits in a referendum context 
and so that informs how any border poll might progress. The other project I am involved 
with, and Aoife O’Donoghue has contributed to this, is co-hosting a blog series looking 
at issues around any possible border poll and Irish unification.  There is a very good blog 
coming up by Oran Doyle, who is examining the issue of what question will be asked, and 
that again will be one of the themes I will be looking at.
So, we have a lot of referendums in Ireland; we have them at a rate of approximately one 
a year and we’ve been doing this for quite a long time.  So, there are well-developed 
patterns and practice in how we do this; that has developed a certain equilibrium in how 
things operate and that applies to two main things I am going to touch on, one of which is 
information and the other is money.
When we talk about a border poll, and that requirement in the GFA for concurrent polls, 
it’s important to bear in mind that information and money will flow fairly freely across 
borders. The border is a line on a map, but when it comes to information, when it comes 
to modern and traditional media, everybody in Ireland watches the BBC, Sky News and so 
on, and probably vice versa. So, that is one thing to be aware of. From a money point of 
view, and the possibility for money to influence voters and to influence a campaign, that is 
also something that will flow fairly freely. 
So, we need to think fairly carefully about the fact that on the one hand, any vote that 
would be held in Ireland would carry certain expectations: that probably the usual way we 
deal with those issues would be the usual way we would deal with them in this. The risk of 
not doing this that way is that you would upset that equilibrium that has developed around 
how referendums are run in Ireland. That raises the question that if we are going to do 
things in our normal way, what does that mean up here? Because if you don’t do them in 
a similar way in the North, does that potentially create an imbalance or risk of disruption 
in itself?
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So first of all, the question of information arises in two ways; one of which is around voter 
education and the other is around regulation of media. So, if we start with voter education:
1. Voter Education
Before we can get to the question of how information is to be provided to voters, we first 
need to decide on what the poll is about.
There is a very difficult decision to be made here:
• The simpler the question (e.g. United Ireland – Yes or No?), the more it lends itself to  
 Brexit-style over-simplification, where people are voting to set off on a journey without 
 knowing the ultimate destination. In the same way that the terms of Brexit probably  
 needed to be sketched out in broad terms before people voted on it, the terms of   
 reunification would also need to be sketched out in broad terms in advance of a 
 Border Poll so that people understand roughly what they are voting for or against.
• This immediately raises a difficulty about who would be responsible for settling this  
 broad outline detail. It could in theory be negotiated between the three governments,  
 but this seems likely to be a fraught, drawn-out process. Some form of citizens’   
 assembly may have an important role to play here, to de-couple the issue from 
 party politics and allow for in-depth, non-partisan deliberation.
• Assuming this obstacle can be overcome (which might be assuming a lot), a further  
 difficulty arises. The more constitutional details you pin down in advance, the more  
 complex the proposal becomes, and the more difficult it would be to explain to the   
 electorate. There might also be more scope and incentive for misinformation, in
 that there would be specific elements to the proposal that could be seized on and   
 misrepresented in a way that is less possible when you are only voting on the broad  
 principle, with the details to be worked out later. But on balance, having observed how  
 Brexit played out, I am inclined to think that these challenges are prices worth paying  
 for avoiding the fallacy of asking people to vote on a completely opaque proposal.
So, if you proceed with a poll that offers a choice between maintaining the status quo, 
or pursuing a particular model of reunification, the next question is how to meet the 
challenge of educating the electorate on both parts of the island.
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We have had considerable experience south of the border of the Referendum 
Commission as an independent and objective body charged with raising awareness of 
the fact that a referendum is being held, and of the issues up for determination. It has 
not been perfect by any means – persistent issues have arisen around being afforded 
inadequate time and resources to do its work. On occasion, some political actors have 
questioned the impartiality of some of the information provided – e.g. Brendan Howlin 
in the Oireachtas Inquiries referendum; Doherty v RefCom (although these criticisms 
have generally been rejected, including by the courts). Also, its mandate to provide 
neutral information has meant that the content produced has sometimes been dull 
and uninteresting.
As against this, it is now a settled and trusted feature of referendums in Ireland. Some of 
its chairpersons have taken a more active role in answering questions and responding to 
misinformation in addition to providing neutral set-pieces, which has been well received. 
It has become a feature of the referendum landscape here for over 20 years and the 
public would expect to see it active in a Border Poll situation.
I would argue that there should be a Referendum Commission or equivalent body; and it 
should be a single body with responsibility for voter education on both sides of the border, 
so as to avoid duplication and possible contradiction or confusion. But if this approach 
were taken, then – mindful of the importance of the Commission being perceived as 
entirely impartial – it might be better for it to be a distinct, ad hoc body, drawing on the 
experience of the Irish RefCom, but chaired perhaps by an independent person from 
outside of Ireland who would be an “honest broker” agreed between political leaders 
on all sides in advance. Otherwise, it might be all too easy to portray the Commission as 
being biased in favour of a particular outcome in the way that the Government campaign 
challenged in McCrystal was found to be. The Commission would need to be given a 
lengthy run-in period to do its work, gradually ramping up the intensity as the poll drew 
closer, and it would need to be given considerable resources to prepare documentation, 
online materials., advertisements, and perhaps even public events. It should also follow 
the lead of Mr Justice Kevin Cross from the marriage referendum and take a proactive 
role in engaging with significant claims made by campaign groups which misrepresent
the proposal.
2. Media Regulation
As with the Referendum Commission, an accepted part of how referendums south of 
the border have operated is the fact that broadcast media are under an obligation to 
cover the campaign in a manner that is fair to all interests concerned, and to present 
the broadcast matter in an objective and impartial manner without any expression of the 
broadcaster’s own views. Political advertising is prohibited. A moratorium is imposed 
on broadcast coverage from noon on the day before the poll, to allow for a period of 
reflection among voters.
Again, this arrangement is not without its flaws: for example, there is no regulation 
whatsoever of print or digital media, even though the boundaries between traditional 
television and radio and online content are becoming increasingly fluid, and the way in 
which people consume media has changed enormously.  Television and radio remain 
highly influential, but far less than they were.
Equally, the manner of its implementation has been problematic ever since the judgment 
in the Coughlan case; many broadcasters have resorted to a rigid and sometimes slavish 
application of “equal time” and a stopwatch approach, even though the Broadcasting 
Commission have clarified that there are multiple ways in which a fair and balanced 
approach can be achieved. So, there is room for debate about how these rules and their 
implementation can be improved upon. However, as they are part of the referendum 
culture south of the border, they cannot realistically be abandoned altogether.
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The more challenging question would be how to operate consistent rules in both parts 
of the island. Since media is consumed without geographic restrictions, it would make 
no sense to regulate the media in one way in Northern Ireland and in another way in the 
south. There would have to be an agreed position across the whole island – and ideally in 
mainland UK as well, since BBC, Sky etc are routinely consumed across Ireland, north and 
south. If these channels were not regulated, but Irish broadcasters were, it would create 
an imbalance in the entire process.
But how would you make this work? Would it necessitate primary legislation in the UK, 
or would existing legislation be sufficient? And even if this was dealt with, might there 
be difficulties in harmonising implementation, particularly since UK broadcasters are 
less experienced in referendum coverage? How might it impact on the legitimacy of the 
process if UK broadcasters were seen to be leaning towards a No vote by giving more 
coverage to the No arguments and claims, or giving a harder time to those arguing for 
a Yes vote?
3. Funding
The third main bone of contention that has arisen in the regulation of Irish referendum 
campaigns is the issue of campaign finance. On the state side, the position is reasonably 
settled: the State may not use funds to advocate for an outcome on just one side. It must 
either refrain from directly using public funds for campaign purposes, or allocate funds 
equally on both sides (the former is the preferred approach, with the latter never having 
been tried to date). Intentional and overt campaigning on one side using public funds has 
been found to breach this rule, as has unintentional or disguised bias in the provision of 
supposedly neutral and objective information.
There are some aspects which are less clear; for example, the case law states that certain 
direct use of state funding (such as a Minister using state transport to attend a campaign 
event) will not breach the principle. Even less clear is the position relating to indirect 
funding, such as general funding provided to political parties or civil society groups who 
campaign for a particular outcome. Finally, the rule has only been applied to the campaign 
period proper (i.e. when the referendum is formally called) and has not been applied to 
the pre-campaign period (which may be important in long, drawn-out debates leading up 
to the actual campaign). However, to date, none of these issues has been litigated.
The principle that state funds should not be used in a partisan way is again a settled 
feature of referendum culture in Ireland, and has been directly endorsed by the Venice 
Commission as best practice in referendums. So, it would be reasonable to expect it to 
apply in a border poll scenario; and as with the broadcasting regulations, it would be 
reasonable to expect it to apply to Whitehall as well as Stormont. The arrangements for 
this would need to be worked out – whether legal or non-legal, and what level of detail 
would be provided on the issues in the grey area above. As before, the aim should be for 
a degree of harmony between the jurisdictions, and this may create practical challenges 
along the way.
Private funds are, if anything, even more complicated – not least because to date, Ireland 
and the UK have taken completely different approaches to this issue. Ireland has limited 
donations for political purposes but allowed parties and civil society groups to spend as 
much as they can raise within the limits prescribing what can be donated by individuals 
and corporations. Private individuals have been free to spend as much as they like in a 
private capacity; in such a historic vote, this may prove particularly problematic.
The UK has taken the opposite approach of limited spending rather than donations. 
For example, in the Scottish independence referendum, there was no limit imposed on 
the donations that could be accepted, but lead campaign groups had a spending limit of 
£1.5 million, while political parties and smaller groups had separate, lower limits. A study 
of 25 OECD countries has shown that spending limits are more common than limits on 
donations. However, they have proven difficult to implement in practice in the UK, and 
controversy is ongoing in relation to breach of these rules by the Leave side during the 
Brexit campaign.
A key issue to be resolved in any border poll, therefore, would be whether to regulate 
the spending of private funds separately in each jurisdiction, or to take a harmonised 
approach; and if the latter, which approach to adopt? There is no obvious answer to 
this dilemma.
Finally, one of the main ways in which private funds are channelled nowadays is into 
advertising on social media and other online outlets. At present, this is completely 
unregulated in Ireland – I am not familiar with the exact position in the UK. Whatever it is, 
it would again seem important that an agreed and harmonised position could be arrived 
at, and ideally not one that goes for minimal or no regulation, since the scope for outside 
interference and abuse would be enormous. This is no small task and would likely 
require considerable groundwork and negotiation in advance of any border poll.
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PRESENTATION 2: 
IRELAND: REFLECTIONS ON THE CONVENTION
AND THE REFERENDUMS
Dr Jane Suiter, Dublin City University, Associate Professor, School of Communications
I am going to be talking about deliberation and the Irish referendums, rather than the media 
and social media environment. I want to talk about three constitutional reviews in Ireland. 
The first Irish Constitutional Convention began in 2012 so we have nearly 8 years of these 
kinds of assemblies using deliberation in advance of referendums. Some of it is good, and 
bad, but it provides a lot of lessons and food for thought for anybody considering border 
polls. The most interesting thing about the first Convention is it brings together politicians 
and randomly selected citizens. The idea is to have a broad range of people, of interests 
and crucially have citizens involved who aren’t usually involved in these things, people 
who don’t usually turn up to town hall meetings or even to tennis or rugby clubs.
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The first Convention covered a wide range of issues, the best-known being Marriage 
Equality that led to the Marriage Equality referendum. But there was a large number of 
recommendations presented to parliament and some of them were roundly ignored. 
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The second Irish Citizen’s Assembly was made up of 99 citizens, so there were no 
politicians involved in this, and that does lead to a slightly different dynamic although we 
do have research to show involving the politicians didn’t actually lead to the elite capture 
that would have been predicted and that we ourselves were fearful of before the first 
one. This second assembly discussed abortion, but also climate change, ageing society 
and fixed term parliaments. One interesting aspect is the link back to the representative 
system, a feature which is often  ignored. In the cases of both abortion and climate 
change the Oireachtas set up special parliamentary committees, to consider the reports 
of the Citizens; thus in both of those instances, the politicians debated the report from the 
assembly. They called a lot of the same witnesses, a lot of the same experts. They heard 
a little bit less of the ordinary person’s testimony, which was a large part of the Assembly, 
listening to people’s lived experience as well as listening to experts.
The third assembly is the current one which is examining gender equality, and again there 
was the testimony of experts, and also people’s lived experiences, so for example, single 
fathers who had been impacted, lesbian mothers, and so on.  
 
The motivation behind the introduction of  this kind of deliberative democracy was an 
effort to rebuild legitimacy and trust between the government and the people, post the 
imposition of austerity in the 2008 – 2011 period. A group of political scientists had run 
an experimental citizen’s assembly, We the Citizens, which informed some of the initial 
design choices. Interestingly, Alan Renwick  ran one on Brexit as well, in London. Thus, 
Brexit is an issue that has been part of a citizen’s assembly, which I think might be an 
interesting thing to think about. 
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The idea is not that people will change their minds, but that they will engage with 
evidence.  I think is very important given the hyper media environment we are in at the 
moment, an environment where it’s not even which facts, but even the mere presence of 
facts, which is often contested in the public discourse. So, it is an environment where we 
can say there is expertise, there are some facts that we can lay claim to.  There is actually 
some evidence that we can consider.
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It is actually argumentative, and I think that is really important, but the difference between 
the kind of argument that is privileged within deliberation is very different from the kind of 
deliberation that is privileged within a court of law, or within a debating society.  The idea 
is to present the arguments, but it is as equally important to be persuaded as to persuade.  
The point is not to be there to persuade others of your own argument; the point is to listen 
to the arguments and be open to being persuaded as well as to persuade. So, it is a very 
different kind of deliberation to that which we find in elite institutions, such as parliaments 
and so on, where the point is nearly always to persuade. And the point as well is to try 
and find solutions beyond adversarial politics. I think this is particularly important in a 
referendum environment, which we know always facilitates the binary; it’s nearly always a 
yes or a no within a referendum.  So the point is to try and look beyond that binary type of 
solution, to look beyond the adversarial protest and to think about fostering solutions. 
And it’s important that it’s also about “losers’ consent”; so it’s not just about the 
majoritarian decision, and be damned the losers, the kind of thing we saw in the Brexit 
debates, with what happened to the 48% after that referendum result.  It’s about trying 
to be inclusive.  Now of course it doesn’t always achieve all of this, but these are the 
normative principles in the deliberative democracy literature.
 
Referendums are almost an antithesis to this; referendums privilege a very binary debate; 
referendums almost facilitate agenda manipulations. As we heard earlier, the minority 
might be the political elite attempting to manipulate the agenda in their own interests, 
and so on. Referendums facilitate symbolic battles, and in this way are often about the 
language of the street. Brexit is really interestng in this regard, because you can really see 
the language that won, the language of Leave, was actually the language of the street, the 
language of people, while the language of remain was mired in the language of expertise, 
and experts.  So, one of the ideas of deliberation is that you bring that expertise to the 
people but the language that comes out of it can actually be the language that ordinary 
people speak because it has been mediated through ordinary citizens, randomly 
selected citizens, which intervenes and mediates it in a different way.  
There is a new branch of deliberative 
literature that talks about this possibility of 
marrying these parallel streams of deliberative 
democracy and direct democracy. Rather than 
pitting them against one another, which is 
what the literature would traditionally 
have done.
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The focus now is on the question of whether deliberative democracy might help us 
counter some of the worst pathologies of direct democracy. One of the interesting 
questions is the interaction of deliberation and referendums; whether the interaction of 
deliberative and direct democracy can be about increasing representative legitimacy, 
increasing reflective legitimacy.  Separate to that is the question of improving the 
information ecosphere which we know can be easily manipulated in referendum 
campaigns. And of course in the kind of environment we are talking about at the moment, 
there are also questions around the affordances of the social media platforms.  In 
particular, advertising isn’t regulated, never mind the actual content that’s platformed on 
social media. Deliberation offers the possibility of having an informational space, which is 
based on evidence, based on argument, where we can see the contested facts, and the 
different arguments. 
Some of the research we are still working on, on the abortion referendum for example, 
looked at the media debates afterwards and looked at when advocates from either 
side might make claims based on evidence that was found to be contested within the 
assembly, the journalists were actually able to use that evidence to stop it spreading 
within the broadcast debates, and so on.   
And the third really important feature we have found with this marriage of the deliberative 
with direct democracy is promoting other regarding behavious, in other words, promoting 
empathy between people.  Because the deliberative democracy strand privileges ordinary 
voices and lived experience, where people get to stand up and tell their fellow citizens 
what the impact of this legislaion or this constitutional provision has had on them and their 
lives and their children’s lives. That’s something that the citizens react to, that they take 
on board.  We have done some studies looking at whether these deliberative precursors 
to a referendum enhance subjective and objective knowledge, and we looked at the 
children’s referendum, the marriage equality referendum and the abortion referendum:
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So we can say from our papers, in terms of scaling up, the deliberative phases mattered 
by enhancing the quality of the vote at those referendums. People were voting with 
greater knowledge, both objective and subjective; they were voting with greater empathy, 
and it helped increase the correct voting, in the political science terminology, which 
is where people are actually voting in line with their own values, rather than voting 
sometimes on matters that are outside of these.   While there are other things we can 
discuss, from a normative point of view, the evidence of having deliberative precursors 
to a referendum is encouraging. 
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Question 1. The question of conducting the referendum north and south, and 
constitutional and political culture; is it possible to coordinate referendums north and 
south, if the political cultures are fundamentally different? Are the constitutional and 
political structures and culture really sufficiently similar to allow that kind of coordination 
to take place?
Conor: I think it is one of the fundamental challenges in this whole process; I’m not going 
to give an answer to that question, because I can’t claim to know enough about Northern 
Ireland to speak to the culture here, although my gut instinct is that you’re right, they are 
very different cultures. On that question on consensus in the south, one of the things 
about the referendums process, and I think this has been enhanced to a degree by the 
use of a Citizens Assembly, is the idea of ‘losers’’ consent’.  Losers’ consent was there 
previously, to an extent anyway, because we have a lot of referendums and because 
people get to have a direct say, and the campaign process has constraints built into it, 
designed to avoid significant imbalance in that process, there’s probably always been 
a sense that people are willing to accept the result if there is the satisfaction of a fair 
fight.  Referendums in the south over the years have given losers the satisfaction of a 
fair fight. Take the Divorce Referendum in 1995; it passed by less than 1%, in a context 
where there was significant controversy both about use of funds on the Yes side leading 
to the McKenna judgement, and imbalance in the broadcast time leading to the Coughlin 
judgement. And yet ultimately the No side, having litigated it and lost, accepted the result. 
So, there is something about that sense that people feel, “well we get to disagree, but this 
is ultimately how we resolve the disagreement; and so we accept that”.
If we say that the political cultures are too different, do we do it differently?  Or do we see 
if we need to try and converge a little bit if it’s going to be a concurrent referendum? If we 
do it completely differently in each jurisdiction, then you get spill over; how it gets done 
in one jurisdiction affects the equilibrium of how it gets done in the other. At the moment 
I think we should explore how we can address that challenge, rather than throwing our 
hands up in the air and saying it can’t be done. 
Jane: I think one of the most important things about thinking about ways you can allow 
people have their say, is that the deliberative process allows that. You bring people in and 
it’s inclusive; they’re listened to, respected and not shouted down.  One of the things that 
is most often said to me, especially by older people, and more especially by older women, 
is “nobody has ever listened to me before” when they’ve come out of one of these 
assemblies.  The deliberation allows people the space to actually be listened to. I think 
that ultimately, the British, Irish and Northern Irish cultures aren’t really all that different. 
Just look at Brexit and how contested that was, and yet ultimately there’s the consent 
of Remainers.
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Question 2. There’s no losers’ consent here or in GB, so what is the approach we should 
adopt? Is there a need for separate different structures for the conduct of the referendum?
Conor: If you were to go for a kind of ad hoc advisory referendum in the south for 
example, then in principle it doesn’t have to be done in the same way. For example, if it’s 
a referendum to amend the Irish Constitution, there are all sorts of legal requirements. 
There are Supreme Court decisions and legislation which regulate how that is conducted. 
Whereas if it’s an ad hoc advisory  ‘do you want a United Ireland or not, and we work 
out the details later’  then you can loosen those rules and you can say, “it’s not the same 
as any one we’ve ever had so we can do it in a different ad hoc way for this particular 
process”. So that’s one way of doing it.  That comes with a downside that it starts to look 
like Brexit: that you’re voting on something when you don’t know what the final product 
is going to look like. I’m not sure how you resolve that; there’s a big downside whichever 
way you do it.  But the reality is that it’s built in to the GFA, it’s built into the way we do 
things in Ireland; direct democracy is ultimately where this question gets resolved. And so, 
whichever model you go for, there’s a big challenge built into that. So, do you go for the 
idea of two referendums? Do you have the initial one first, in your two different ways, on 
the basic principle; then do you hammer out the detail and then have another referendum, 
in a more convergent way? For me, there’s a big struggle as to how do you make all this 
work? Because with all the models, I can just see landmines all over the place. 
On the losers’’ consent, in Northern Ireland if there was a 50% +1, it’s difficult to see what 
consent looks like.
Eilish Rooney: In the Transitional Justice Institute a few years ago, we designed a 
Transitional Justice Grassroots Toolkit that raised difficult issues in the transition here 
that is ongoing. Organising with one small local group, the Bridge of Hope, we entered 
into conversations that involved around 500 people, about very difficult issues. 
The conversations were well-structured, you could say it was deliberative. What we found 
was that people were willing to listen; they weren’t in conversations that led to decisions 
being taken; those conversations weren’t like that. But deliberative conversations about 
a border poll or constitutional matters in the north, in my limited experience, have been 
met with a willingness to engage. Women’s organisations have been very willing to 
engage; and it doesn’t mean they agree and that’s not the objective of the conversation, 
to get agreement at the endo of it, but it is the objective of the conversation to articulate 
positions and to have your say, and sometimes to have your say in a way that can’t be 
tracked back to you.  But my experience has not been that the difference in culture is 
so radically different that people would not engage in a deliberative exchange. 
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Aoife: The Feminist Judgement Project was an overtly feminist deliberative discussion, 
in which people were willing to engage.  On Article 41 of the Irish Constitution, which 
includes two very different perspectives on women’s place in the home, people were very 
willing to engage. We have done some work in Northern Ireland as well, in the Feminist 
Judgement Project, and there wasn’t this massive cultural difference. 
In relation to losers’ consent; we wouldn’t have Repealed the 8th, if there had been losers’ 
consent. There wasn’t losers’ consent; people campaigned, for a very long time to remove 
it, and that is really important. I do think people should keep fighting, and that is what 
democracy is for. Democracy means that people do keep fighting for what they think is 
right. It’s important not to valorise the consensual, because consensus can also take away 
democracy, it can take away that idea of people contesting, getting involved and voting, 
having campaigns and you can’t delegitimise a campaign because you say we’ve had 
losers’ consent, even if it’s people I don’t agree with. 
Question 3. Most people I speak to think a deliberative assembly to discuss the future of 
Northern Ireland would be desirable if it could be made to work.  But most people I speak 
to are sceptical it can be made to work.  What kind of process would you need to get a 
representative sample of people in the room to discuss Northern Ireland’s future, and then 
how the work of a Citizens’ Assembly is then treated in the wider political system can be 
problematic?  Would politicians and the media accept and respect it, and treat it seriously? 
What can be done to make it easier at some point in the future for that kind of deliberative 
discussion on this most contested issue, to take place? Eilish has spoken about some 
forms of conversations; what about the provision in the New Decade New Approach, for 
citizen engagement, including an annual citizens assembly? Is there a way of using that in 
developing an understanding and acceptance of that model, as a way of doing politics?
Jane: Our understanding of losers’ consent is that people are willing to abide by the law, 
not that they were never going to campaign against it again, nor that they accepted it 
for the rest of their lives.  People accept the decision, and that the outcome reflected 
the majority position, even when people were pro-life, and they continued to campaign 
against it. Was the referendum legitimate? Yes, they were consenting to the legitimacy 
of the process; they were not guaranteeing that they were never going to fight against 
the issue.
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Representative sample of the people in the room?  It might be interesting to have 
initial processes around the different communities, for example, bring in people with 
unionist views and talk to them in a deliberative way , listen to them and really hear what 
their issues are before you would push it to the more challenging conversation about 
constitutional futures?
How it’s treated in the political and media environment in the north is related to that; that 
would depend on where it came from, but I think the media would report in reasonably 
good faith what happened.
Question 4. Mechanisms of the citizens’ assembly – how was it able to maintain its 
autonomy in the face of any kind of political interference?
Jane: the crucial thing I think was that the people in the Citizens forums were self-
selected. They volunteered to go along, so you get a very different kind of person 
volunteering to go to these things, than if you randomly select by knocking on people’s 
doors and asking people to turn up. So, the composition is different, and what goes on 
inside them is different when it’s randomly selected v. self-selected. The practice in Ireland 
has been to not allow anybody into the room who has actively campaigned on either 
side, so if you’ve been part of an interest group or a campaign group, that’s campaigned 
on this, that excludes you from being able to be a member. There’s pros and cons to that 
but that was how it was dealt with, especially with the abortion issue.  The second thing 
is facilitation; so, when you’re at the round tables in the rooms, it’s absolutely vital to have 
strong facilitation; and where voices aren’t privileged and every member is encouraged to 
speak up, and you keep track of that and so on.  And again, that changes how the whole 
thing works, but of course it’s not perfect and even by the selection of those who are 
going to give evidence, that’s one way for lead interests to impose solutions they want so 
not completely divorced from the political system but I think it’s something you have to be 
really aware of and put in whatever measures you can to act against it. 
PANEL 3: 
SCOTLAND AND WALES  
Chair: Ciaran White, School of Law, Ulster University
Dr Silvia Suteu, Faculty of Law, University College London
Prof Richard Wyn Jones, Director of Cardiff University’s Wales Governance
and Dean of Public Affairs 
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PRESENTATION 1: 
THE REFERENDUM EXPERIENCE IN SCOTLAND
Dr Silvia Suteu, Faculty of Laws, University College London
What I am going to do today is reflect on the Scottish independence referendum 
experience, the process running up to the 2014 vote, and then to include some outstanding 
questions or issues that might not have been resolved and might come up in a border poll, 
and as we have seen in the Brexit referendum, have come up in that instance. 
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Some initial questions to get us reflecting on the Scottish experience. Was the 
referendum actually a good idea in terms of settling an independence question? 
It’s not really a straightforward answer that we find when we look comparatively, and the 
reasons for that, these have been raised earlier, are it’s too much of a black and white 
mechanism, its potential actually to polarise rather than solve issues etc., although in the 
Scottish instance I think it was the right mechanism precisely because of its bluntness, 
so sometimes that actually works in favour of the referendum mechanism itself because 
independence questions might be precisely the type of questions best solved by such a 
mass participatory mechanism that does produce a blunt result. Then whether that result 
is seen as legitimate is a slightly separate question.
A related question, that came up before, can referendums themselves be seen as 
deliberative? 
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Going back to critiques of referendums as a mechanism, as a tool, the argument might 
go that they are too prone to elite control. So not just that they are majoritarian blunt 
tools, but they are too easily manipulated by elites, often politicians, or nefarious elites 
in society, or indeed outside.  And while that may be true, I think there are ways to tame 
this; so for example if the process is designed in such a way as to ensure collaboration 
between different branches of power, by intergovernmental agreement, as was the case 
in Scotland and the London based authorities there are ways to mitigate that potential 
for elite control.  And you might say that all political positions are prone to such control, 
and actually there is an argument to be made that referendums can reclaim their radical 
democratic potential, so referendums can act against that elite control, to mitigate it, when 
it might exist otherwise. 
Another objection from the deliberative side is that you just can’t scale deliberation 
upwards; it only works in micro settings; it doesn’t really work at a societal level. It’s a 
question of size and citizen’s ability to engage, learn and reflect, to potentially change 
their minds so that a mass referendum campaign can only ever be perhaps participatory 
but not really deliberative. But, from the work that has been done on this, it is often 
a problem of how you design the process, rather than a principled objection that 
deliberative democrats raise.  I tend to agree with that myself and think especially when 
linked with other sites of deliberation in society, referendums can promote deliberation 
more widely. 
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Some initial questions to get us reflecting on the Scottish experience. Was the 
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deliberative? 
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There is also a question of what would make a referendum outcome perceived to be 
legitimate, and the emphsasis on process, that I’ll detail later on, would have us believe 
that legitimacy is what matters and there is certainly truth to that. We’ve heard about 
losers’’ consent and how that might be achieved, and certainly a fair process that is also 
perceived to have been fair, so giving the losing side a chance to fight that battle, is quite 
important. But I think, certainly in the UK context, there is a paradox. On the one hand you 
have referendums that require quite a bit of clarity about the predictability of the process, 
but that doesn’t square neatly with the UK Constitution, not just because it’s uncodified 
but because it emphasises ambiguity, flexibility, and often prefers political processes 
rather than direct participation from citizens in decision making. So, one of the points that 
I’ll emphasise at the end is that I think that interplay worked out well in the Scottish 
case, but it may not necessarily be easily replicated elsewhere, including here, for 
different reasons.  
Coming to the Northern Irish context, Cass Sunstein talks about the law of  group 
polarisation and how difficult it is to avoid in polarised contexts, to avoid only leading to 
more polarisation, and further retrenchment of divided views.  So opening up the question 
may not lead to consensus, or a reasoned final decision, but just further polarisation. And 
people like John Dryzek have written on the promise of deliberative democracy in divided 
societies, arguing that you need to decouple deliberation from decision making in such 
contexts, to take off the pressure of the decision from the deliberation in that forum, which 
frees you up to do things differently, to reflect and to change your mind and engage with 
your peers. Now, a referendum seems not to be doing that, so what can we learn from 
Scotland and how it ran its Indyref in 2014, and before, and what lessons can we 
learn from that? 
There a few things that are typically listed as reasons why Indyref worked and avoided 
associated problems of deliberation and participation.  
The question of elite control is said to have been kept in check primarily because of the 
initial cooperation between Scottish institutions and their London counterparts;  a political 
agreement that was reached in 2012 set in motion a process, backed by political goodwill.
Inclusiveness: we have already heard about the franchise being opened to younger 
people. Some of the research that I have done looked at whether the referendum 
campaign actually reached women voters as well.  Certainly in the early stages of the 
campaign, women were seen to have been comparatively less engaged and forgotten 
by both campaigns. Then, as the polls were narrowing, and the campaigns realised that 
women could swing this, they refocused their advertising and the marketing materials to 
women and that gap between women voters and male voters narrowed. 
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Other things that made the referendum more successful: the clarity of the referendum 
question, but also the process in which it was set. So, very early on, and from the 
Edinburgh Agreement as well, it was agreed that it would be a binary question rather 
than a multiple choice question.  So the Devo-Max question would not be on the ballot. 
There is some argument as to whether it ended up being on the ballot anyway, because 
that’s what many people ended up voting on, even when they voted no. But the fact that 
the Scottish government even though it didn’t have to, chose to involve the Electoral 
Commission in setting the question, having the clarity of its question checked, and 
engaging in a transparent process, designed to come up with the clearest possible 
question, was seen as a plus of that process.  There are also some questions though, as 
to how much clarity you can actually get on the question of independence, in so far as the 
question put to the people was “do you want Scotland to become independent?” yes/no; 
that might be clear, but what independence actually meant was far less clear. The indyref 
campaign did not provide a final answer to that because it was just not possible to do so. 
This would have to be negotiated following the referendum.    
Other aspects: the campaign’s length and quality; so depending on where you start, from 
the start of the campaign and the Edinburgh agreement in 2012, that gave the campaigns 
two years to design the legal process, set in place a regulatory framework.  Once the 
date was set, it was also fixed, which was important and differed for example from the 
Quebec experience when the date was changed, and contraversially so, because it was 
perceived as the political authorities trying to mess with the outcome. Or you could view 
the campaign as actually going much further back than that, to the 2011 elections, the 
SNP had in its manifesto very clearly that it wanted to pursue the case for independence, 
or you could even view it as going back decades since the independence question was 
there.   Also, the question of losers’ consent was less intractable in so far as the turnout 
was high, almost 85%, and the vote was clear in favour of ‘no’, with a 10% margin between 
the two sides. If we define losers’ consent as accepting that the issue has been settled, 
then clearly it hasn’t been the case.  If we think of losers’ consent as accepting the 
process was fair, and that particular decision in 2014 was legitimate and procedurally fair, 
then I think the answer should be more positive.  [This photo may bring back memories, 
but illustrates the political impetus for starting the campaign in 2012.]
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One of the interesting lessons of the Indyref 2014 is to see just how much of the legislative 
process was relatively uncontraversial.
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So, you had the Edinburgh Agreement, you had the Section 30 Order from the UK 
Government itself; these gave the Electoral Commission a role to play in the process.  
It’s interesting to note how much the Scottish government followed the rules and 
prepared the political parties for the Referendum Act.  So for example, the role of the 
Electoral Commission was part of the Edinburgh Agreement, but it also followed the 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) where it didn’t have 
to, so for example, including the Electoral Commission in setting the question.  And it 
also departed from PPERA, where it reflected on, for example, Welsh experience with 
campaign designation and where PPERA was seen not to be fit for purpose.  So there 
was an informed approach in setting out the legislative and regulatory framework. 
In terms of the referendum period and purdah period running up to the actual vote, these 
were more or less in line with PPERA rules and designed to make sure that the statutory 
limits on campaign spending in particular would apply, 16 weeks ahead of the vote, and 
in the purdah period (28 days before the vote) when campaign promotional material was 
not meant to be distributed by public authorities.  Campaign and spending rules were 
very important, with the Electoral Commission overseeing the application of these rules. 
Importantly also, designing quite detailed reportings as well.  And perhaps surprisingly, 
coming out of this, is that the campaigns seem to have followed the rules themselves. 
There were some reporting issues resulting in a few thousand pounds at most fines, and not 
criminal sanctions as far as I know. The overall spending did go over by about £2m, but the 
Scottish Government argued this was on account of the higher than expected turnout. 
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Below is an extract from an information booklet, distribute by the Electoral Commission. 
So, on the question of whether people were informed when casting their vote, because 
of the widespread deliberations, physical and online, but if you look at the information 
material that the Electoral Commission itself produced, you had it struggling with its 
neutraility requirements. So what it ended up doing in this booklet, was including, in 
its answer to the question “what is independence”, “what are you actually voting on”, 
it just included on two sides of the pamphlet, adverts from the yes campaign and the 
no campaign.  It didn’t actually give you an answer, but allowed you to make up your 
own mind. 
DELIBERATING CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURES  |  55
I’ll only focus on a few of the unresolved questions. On the role of social media, during 
the Scottish referendum campaign in Scotland fair rules from traditional media were 
transposed to social media. This was before the rise of fake news and disinformation 
campaigns; all of those questions are still unresolved, and the Brexit process shows 
us how important it is to address them, not just for referendum campaigns but also for 
elections. Media impartiality did come up in so far as the BBC was attacked, for not 
holding to its impartiality duty, and especially how critical it was of the pro-independence 
stance and seen as not as equally critical of the status quo campaign.  
The question of sequencing and interlinkages of participatory mechanisms I think is 
really interesting. Had ‘yes’ carried the day, what the Scottish government promised was 
another participatory and deliberative process, a Constitutional Convention, that would 
draft the new independent Scottish Constitution, and setting out some things it wanted to 
see in that Constitution.  That didn’t happen, but what the Irish example is also bound to 
provide, are lessons for how you actually move from the micro to the macro deliberative 
processes of a Constitutional Convention or a Citizen’s Assembly, and a referendum.  
I think there is still a lot of work that scholars and academics need to do on thinking 
how those work. 
PRESENTATION 1: 
WELSH REFERENDUMS: THE STORY SO FAR
Prof Richard Wyn Jones, Director of Cardiff University’s Wales
Governance and Dean of Public Affairs
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I am a political scientist, interested in why people voted the way they voted as well as the 
of the particular proposals they were voting on. 
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To give some context, I am going to talk you through three devolution referendums, and I 
towards the end I also want to say something about “losers’ consent”.
I want to start with political culture, which was raised earlier. Wales is a one party dominant 
political system, with Labour as the dominant party; last December Wales voted again for 
Labour making it a century of Labour dominance.  
What it means is that the debates about devolution in Wales have been debates within the 
dominant party.  The particular constitutional proposals we voted on are more about trying 
to bind the wounds within the dominant party rather than arriving at anything coherent; it’s 
more about party management than any great principle, as you’ll see. It’s certainly more 
about party management than securing legitimacy. And one of the interesting things is 
that the other parties implicitly accept the rules of the game.  
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Within one-party dominance, what happens is that the key cleavage runs through the 
dominant party and the other parties arrange themselves around the cleavage in that 
dominant party. So Plaid Cymru and the Liberal Democrats support the ‘nationalist’ wing 
of the Labour Party, whereas the Conservatives try to support the ‘unionist’ wing of the 
Labour Party. For everybody concerned, the principle of Home Rule - if I can use that 19th 
century language – is much more important than the detail of what we are voting on. 
The final point about the context is that we have an extremely weak media, so even if 
anybody did want to have genuine discussion, which nobody does, it would be extremely 
difficult to do it anyway. 
Attitudes to devolution divide on national identity lines, so if you feel strongly Welsh you 
tend to pro devolution, if you don’t feel strongly Welsh you tend to be hostile. We have 
a large English diaspora in Wales as well; up to a quarter of the Welsh electorate feel 
English and tend not to be particularly supportive of devolution. 
For one side of the devolution divide, the issue is existential, it is survival as the nation. 
For the other side, it matters less. Welsh nationalism is strongly pacifist; non violent direct 
action in Wales is a strong tradition in Wales. 
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There have been three devolution referendums in Wales. 
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There was losers’ consent, in that the supporters of devolution didn’t give up, but they 
accepted that they had been annihilated: when the result is 4 to 1, there’s not much room 
for doubt. 
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The first thing that the Blair government did in 1997 was legislate for referendums in 
Scotland and Wales, which took place on the basis of of proposal set out in White Papers. 
In the Welsh case, it was a very thin document; all very vague and aspirational. The 
actual timing of the referendum was another ‘stroke’; the Welsh vote was held a week 
after the Scottish vote. There was no justification for that; they just knew that the polling 
showed that the Scots votingg yes would bump up the support in Wales a little bit.  It 
was kept out of the election campaign pre-1997, then all the parties had a bit of a break; 
then they started to campaign after the summer at which point Princess Diana died in an 
accident, and they stopped the campaign for a while. Through all of this there was very 
little debate, let alone deliberation of any kind. This was deliberate. The voting split very 
clearly on national identity lines; Welsh identifiers more likely to vote in the first place and 
much more likely to vote yes. The yes campaign was much better organised than the no 
campaign. Note that the regulation in this period was very vague. Conservative Brexiteers 
have susbequently been very agitated about what they view as differential spending 
between the yes and the no campaigns in Wales in 1997.  But little evidence for this; the 
no campaign was chaotic.  The regulatory framework was basically the BBC requirement 
for ‘balance’; the BBC requirements were more important than anything else.  Indeed, you 
could say the BBC contstructed the no campaign by putting people together because 
they were desperately searching for people to represent that side.  
What is interesting about all this in retrospect is that the mandate appears so fragile; only 
1 in 4 of the Welsh electorate voted in favour of devolution. Yet by 1999 – even before the 
Assembly actually met for the first time – support had shot up. 
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Here we got a big vote in favour in the referendum but describing what the referendum 
was about is actually quite difficult!  Formally it was about a move from Part 3 of the 2006 
Government of Wales Act to Part 4 – with both parts setting out different mechanisms 
allowing the National Assembly to create primary legislation. It’s certainly hard to argue 
that there was a fundamental constitutional principle at stake that you should be having 
a referendum on. It’s rather better understood as a way of healing the wounds in the 
Labour Party.  The referendum only happened when it happened because Labour went 
into coalition with Plaid Cymru, and Plaid Cymru insisted on a referendum as the price of a 
coalition. Turn out was risible. It was a post legislative referendum, but five years after the 
fact. 
For reasons that need not detain us here (about the failings of the Part 3 system) the 
status quo was unattractive for all concerned. The no side argued instead for ‘better 
devolution” though it wasn’t clear what that meant.  
PPERA ended up looking like a really problematic piece of legislation because of the 
way the No side ‘gamed’ it.  They did this by refusing to apply for lead designation status 
themselves, which had the effect of stopping the Yes side from getting lead designation 
status. This meant that there were then no mail shots of the kind that went out in Scotland: 
not even that basic kind of information-sharing could happen.  The spending limit on the 
Yes side – forced to operated as a designated rather than a lead campaign – was only 
£100,000 in total. Not even enough to fund a mailshots to every house in Wales. So the 
legislation proved to be really quite problematic. And even if the Electoral Commission 
were really annoyed when I pointed this out in run up Indyref, the Scottish legislation that 
governed that vote was at least  to avoid a repeat.
 
While national identity remained important 
in terms of the vote itself, there was a 
substantial pro devolution shift amongst all 
key demographics and across all of Wales, 
making it look like the ‘settled will’ in the way 
that it clearly wasn’t before that.
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Losers’ consent was generated both in the sense people accepted the legitimacy of what 
went on and also people ended up pretty supportive of what had happened. Why? Part 
of the story is the pro-devolution side viewed themselves as nation builders, and they 
needed to bring people on board. They deliberately reached out in the design of the 
Standing Orders of the Assembly which determined what the Assembly would look like; 
also in terms of the amendments they accepted to the legislation which then followed 
from the referendum and which ended up establishing the Assembly. 
Every time we’ve had a discussion since about more devolution there’s been tended to 
be establish some kind of an all-party Commission, reflecting a very conscious sense that 
this could all go badly wrong and of the need to bring people along.  Of course, there 
are limits to what you can achieve in this way; but that said, you can achieve quite a lot in 
terms of undergirding wider legitimacy if you make the effort. 
What really helped was that Conservatives had nowhere else to go in the first years of 
devolution, when they lost every seat in Wales in the 1997 General Election and didn’t win 
a single seat in Wales in the subsequent one either.  
But setting aside such instrumental consideration, the key point is that supporters of 
devolution made a very self-conscious attempt to bring people along; they were always 
aware that 50.3% of the vote isn’t really enough in itself. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Question 1. For Sylvia, your reference to more intricate questions of inclusiveness – 
can you say a little more about that?
Sylvia: We should think of inclusiveness as both of the franchise itself and public debate 
more broadly. So, in Scotland as you all know the choice was to go with a residence-
based model, basically to take the local elections register and just go with that. Was it 
contested? A bit, Scots living in London were not able to vote, whereas new nationals 
living in Scotland at the time were entitled to vote, but ultimately it was accepted as 
legitimate.
The opening up of the franchise to younger voters was also an SNP driven point on their 
agenda; and could be justified in relation to the type of question that was asked: a lot 
of the arguments were this was a once in a lifetime vote, and that choosing to create a 
new independent state was a choice that younger voters can make, and should make.  
There was quite a lot of enthusiasm expanding that and also it was seen as a positive 
experience for taking that elsewhere, the rest of the UK, other countries etc. Enthusiasm 
for that seems to have died down. 
On the question of how inclusive public debate actually is, there is a danger of thinking 
that the more spaces of debate that you have, the more inclusive that debate will be, and 
that is not necessarily the case.   Some research that I’ve done looking at Iceland but also 
some of the Irish citizen’s assembly experiences show that, for example presuming a lot of 
social media attention means that you’ve opened up access to more potential voters and 
I think that is not necessarily the case.  We know that access to digital platforms by the 
young and urban, etc., keeping those questions in mind, not funding or prioritising certain 
spaces over others is important. Depending on the demographics spread over whichever 
region that had such a vote, you’d have to look at rural voters, more remote voters, older 
voters and the spaces they can actually eventually engage in the deliberation.   Ultimately, 
they did a good job in Scotland, just because of the salience of the issue and that 
brought people out.  Designing that into the system is important and not expecting it will 
automatically follow.
Richard: In Wales, the franchise was never an issue because there was this kind of path 
dependency; I’m almost certain the 1997 referendums in Scotland and Wales were based 
on the local government franchise. The same was true in 1979 I think, partly because one 
of the things that the Labour anti-devolution people in particular were pushing, was that 
if it happens this was local government writ large rather than Westminster writ small, so 
there was a symbolic politics of, of course it’s the local government’s franchise because 
this is a lower status body, but that then fed through into 2014 where there had been a 
tradition of using this, so there was never a big issue at all in Wales. 
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Question 2. How much forethought was given to the question of nation building, and who 
was it that was having that discussion of nation building? 
Sylvia: The Scottish government took the lead on that when they published the White 
Paper Scotland’s Future, trying to go through every aspect of what a future Scottish state 
would look like in the event of a Yes vote, including the economy, international relations 
and the constitution making process that would follow.  As you might expect, that still left 
quite a few questions open.  Again, you had a paradox. On the one hand, they had to 
present the case for what would follow, what you’re actually voting on and that argument 
was made in the image of the SNP’s priorities.  Anecdotally, a lot of people who voted No, 
did so because they didn’t want to vote Yes in favour of the SNP’s constitutional future 
state. There was also an Independence Bill that was published, meaning what legislation 
would actually be introduced if the outcome were a Yes vote. That is also significant 
overall for the quality of the process in Scotland, there was still, with all these unknowns, 
a need for clarity about the outcomes on both sides. Either you’re voting in favour of the 
status quo,  or you were voting in favour of a new independent state; still some question 
marks, but this is the road that we would take in the early months when we set in place 
another process to try to settle all these issues. Quite a few of those were controversial, 
the retention of the monarchy for example, the economy, the Bank of England etc. so 
quite a few of those would have probably needed to be open for debate, but were 
presented as the State building project that would be embarked on, should Yes carry the 
day.  I want to make one comment on that because it’s a thought that was triggered by 
Richard’s argument that precisely because the Welsh project was one of nation building, 
that’s why it carried the day eventually. With regard to devolution I think, again going 
back to John Dryzek’s writing on deliberation and divided societies, he makes it plain that 
that is exactly when deliberation is less likely. So, when it’s devolution in the context of a 
decision on state building is when you’re less likely to get the conditions necessary for 
deliberation. So, in a way, when sovereignty is on the table, the stakes are higher so it’s 
harder and harder to get people to sit around the table and engage in reasoned debate, 
as deliberative democrats would have you. I think division and polarisation can complicate 
matters, and certainly in sovereignty matters more so.   
Richard: My response goes back to the first point I made about political culture and the 
centrality of one-partyism to understand anything happening in Welsh politics.  In the 
context of one-party domination, there’s no benefit for devolutionists in having big fights 
within the Labour Party; if they can get anything accepted by the Labour party. The only 
kind of non-negotiable principle is that the thing is directly elected. The view was always 
– going back to the late 1960s, here –as long as it is directly elected, and represents the 
nation, it will gradually accrue legitimacy and power.  So, basically if it’s primary legislation, 
secondary legislation, or whatever, let’s not sweat the detail.  Let’s just get a directly 
elected body. 
In the 1990s, having been annihilated in 1979, for the devolutionists it was a case of just 
trying to catch the tail wind of the Scottish project and the popularity of Blair. But then, 
once the referendum passed, during the passage of what became the Government of 
Wales Act 1998, there were pretty fundamental changes to the legislation, and there was 
a very close collaboration between the devolutionist wing of the Labour party, Plaid Cymru 
and the Liberal Democrats, and a few friendly Conservatives.    Subsequently, partly 
because all models of devolution have proved to be unstable, they have had to change, 
and they have adopted this cross-party consensual approach. They have succeeded, to a 
quite remarkable degree, in moving things forward from where we started in 1999. 
Question 3. How do you deal with a situation, which didn’t happen in the context of 
Scotland and Wales, where there’s an organised boycott, which might be the most likely 
outcome in Northern Ireland? Is there any experience you’re aware of where there’s been 
any attempt to deal with the problems of an organised boycott? What about incentives to 
vote? compulsory voting?
Richard: I wasn’t trying to suggest there was a necessary relationship between legitimacy 
and turnout.  What I was saying is that there is a relationship between what’s at stake 
and turnout. What I suspect is that boycotts become less attractive as a tactic if the result 
is seen to be very close. If I was a strong objector to a United Ireland but feared that for 
whatever reason, the referendum might result in a narrow win, that the proponents of a 
unified Ireland were likely to do well, I would be quite worried about a boycott. It depends 
what the turnout would be, despite the boycott.   The political context would matter 
hugely, in terms of how attractive a boycott would be, or not.  Definitely not compulsory 
voting, that would raise a whole set of issues about legitimacy and would raise so many 
red herrings that I wouldn’t go there, certainly. 
Sylvia: I think what your question raises for me is what goes on before you even ask 
the [referendum] question and before you ever start designing a process?   Is there an 
appetite for asking questions that a referendum can be held on, and actually embarking 
on a deliberative process to begin with? There’s only so much a referendum, and a 
referendum campaign, can do in narrowing the divides, and bringing people together. 
Once you’ve decided that there is a decision-making process going on, the stakes are 
already pretty high, and there’s a risk of people entrenching their own views rather 
than coming together. What goes on before that, whether it’s political process of 
rapprochement or whether its micro deliberations perhaps across the country to try and 
shift popular views and get them to see there is actually something worthwhile in having 
the poll, to begin with, that’s where I would put my energy. In terms of compulsory voting, 
I would say no, but the Australian approach with that might be interesting, where it has 
been the rule.
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Conor: Just to add to the point of incentives to make people vote. The GFA has an 
incentive built in, which is that the British government and the Irish government, both 
governments have committed to that part of that Agreement, that whatever the outcome, 
they will implement it. 
Question 4. Richard, would you talk to us a little more about nation building in the Welsh 
context?
Richard: Very quickly, Wales was annexed and was made indivisible from England 
administratively. There were no administrative legacies of the pre-annexation period that 
survived the ‘union’, as we call it euphemistically. Basically, what you have is a cultural 
difference centred around language and a religious difference with the rise of non-
conformist Protestantism. In the mid 19th century, Wales was fully assimilated except for 
the language and religious culture.   
You then get that classic nation building project you see in central Europe and eastern 
Europe; this classic attempt to build (in this case) Welsh institutions. That’s subsequently 
been the key focus of Welsh nationalism, which is not confined to Plaid Cymru – it’s 
there in the other parties too. So, building Welsh institutions; having the border of Wales 
recognised as enclosing an administrative unit: things that would be taken for granted 
elsewhere.  It is very pragmatic in that sense, but it’s also hugely idealistic.  It’s also got a 
very strong belief that institutions matter.
The very recently growth of an independence movement is very interesting; but with the 
focus on state building it’s also a distinct break from what has happened in the past. 
PANEL 4: 
NORTHERN IRELAND ROUNDTABLE   
Eilish Rooney, Transitional Justice Institute and ASPS, Ulster University
Prof Colin Harvey, Professor of Human Rights Law, Queen’s University of Belfast 
Dr Fidelma Ashe, Transitional Justice Institute and ASPS, Ulster University
Alan Whysall, University College London
Prof Cathy Gormley Heenan, Deputy Vice Chancellor, Ulster University
Chair: Dr Catherine O’Rourke, School of Law and Transitional Justice Institute, 
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PRESENTATION 1: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE 1973 BORDER POLL
Prof Cathy Gormley Heenan, Deputy Vice Chancellor, Ulster University
Though I am presenting today, it’s important to note that this work draws heavily on the 
joint work that Arthur Aughey, Emeritus Professor at Ulster, and I have been engaged in 
recently as part of our thinking and contributions to the UCL Working Group on Unification 
Referendums on  the Island of Ireland. So, this is with credit to Arthur Aughey for his 
extensive contribution here.
For most commentators on the Northern Ireland border poll in 1973, it’s just a footnote in 
history. We haven’t really talked about it very much, and it certainly hasn’t been part of many 
of the debates around what we are talking about today. The academic literature has given 
it a place because it was the first occasion the Westminster parliament actually legislated 
for a referendum, so it tends to be looked at in that perspective, rather than the lessons that 
might be learned from it.  So, I thought it might be useful in today’s workshop to look back in 
order to help us look forward, to look at the issues that were raised in the 1973 referendum 
and what that means for any issues that potentially could come up in a future Northern 
Ireland border poll. 
So, the ballot paper asked people to make a very simple binary choice; the question was 
“do you want Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK”; or, “do you want Northern Ireland 
to be joined with the Republic of Ireland outside of the UK”? 58% of the eligible electorate 
registered to vote, and 99 % of those who did vote, voted for Northern Ireland to remain as 
part of the UK. Just 0.6% voted for Northern Ireland to be joined with the Republic of Ireland. 
The unionist parties saw on reflection that they had achieved a really high turnout of their 
own electorate and that was to achieve their immediate objective. Their main objective 
was avoiding a result in light of the nationalist boycott that was below 50%. So, the unionist 
parties were broadly happy with the result. The nationalist parties were also broadly happy 
because they achieved an almost maximum boycott within their own constituency and 
succeeding in their aim at the time which was to undermine the political value of the result. 
So, often in a zero-sum game, in a lose-lose society, we had a win-win in some respects for 
both sides of the political divide in 1973.
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And it raised the big question as to why boycott? The nationalist objection to the border 
poll was that, if the intention of the border poll was to take a united Ireland completely 
off the table, then it would fail to address the real source of the problem. The nationalist 
view was that the border poll was an attempt to take a united Ireland off the table. So, 
nationalists justified their boycott by trying to argue that the illegitimate majoritarianism 
that existed on the basis of Northern Ireland’s creation guaranteed that unionist 
hegemony effectively, and that meant the border poll result always going to be pre-
ordained, that it was never going to be anything other than that. So, their view was that it 
was illegitimate in conception, but it was also irrelevant in practice because the poll itself 
was not addressing the ethno-national divisions that existed in Northern Ireland, and that 
confirming a majority on that basis would be tantamount to confirming the very problem 
that the poll purported to address; so the ethno-national question was not picked up in 
any way in it.
What relevance is there from the 1973 poll for any future referendum?  
There are three relevant points:
1. The nationalist view that it was pre-ordained or predetermined and the wording of the 
1998 Act makes it clear that a referendum should only be called when the Secretary of 
State considers that the outcome is preordained or predetermined, and it says that “by 
order, the Secretary of State may by order direct the holding of a poll for the purposed 
of Section 1 on the date specified”. The most important part is this: “if it appears likely 
to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Norther Ireland should 
cease to be part of the UK, and form part of a united Ireland”, and there is an element 
of predetermination even in the way that is worded. So, if the first border poll was about 
taking Irish unity off the table, a future border poll as envisaged in the Act is about taking 
the Union off the table and making Irish unity 
the foundation of any settlement. And so, 
the intention of a border poll is sort of the 
same as 1973, except in reverse, to ratify an 
outcome already pre-judged, confirming that 
which is already known. The question that 
follows there then is how meaningful would 
any referendum be in such circumstances, if 
you were making the same arguments that 
had been made in 1973? 
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2. It’s not just the pre-determination of the majority, there’s also the legitimacy question 
that informed the nationalist boycott in 1973. Could that same question of legitimacy justify 
a unionist boycott in any future poll? So, unionists could boycott a future poll for other 
reasons, but it would be difficult for them I suppose to cite 1973 nationalist reasons, that 
Seamus Mallon would have articulated in his book. The traditional unionist defence of 
their rights involves a claim that there exists a people of Northern Ireland with a right to 
self-determination, and therefore any change to the status of Northern Ireland requires the 
consent of the majority or the greater number, and we all know that, but is it a majority of 
the people of Northern Ireland, or the greater number of them, that are expressing a wish 
to see Northern Ireland to cease to be part of the UK? It brings up a big question about 
what constitutes a legitimate majority, and that’s the debatable part here. So, if 57% of 
the eligible electorate, which was almost entirely the unionist population at the time, was 
insufficient to address the real problems in 1973, then would a 50+1%, probably entirely 
Catholic/nationalist be adequate in any future poll? If it was a majority alone that the 
outcome was delivered upon, what does that say about the legitimacy? And if the purpose 
of any border poll is to establish the fact that a majority of those voting in favour of Irish 
unity, the sovereignty question, why should that majority of 50+1% be denied? It goes back 
to that previous question about not dealing with the underlying issue. The 50+1% is the 
sovereign measure, the vote that counts, even if you have a two-referendum strategy, the 
first one on principle, the second on details. If the first were to deliver a vote on Irish unity, 
even in principle, of 50+1%, it’s difficult to imagine how any legitimacy of that initial vote 
could be undermined in any subsequent vote.
3. The objection by nationalists in 1973 was that the purpose of the referendum was not 
democratically deliberative in its approach, that the sovereign choice was problematic 
when it was disconnected from the options that concerned the detail of the constitutional 
arrangements: Vernon Bogdanor calls it ‘the satisfactory relationship’ that could 
accommodate the needs of both Catholic and Protestant communities, and we hear about 
that in the context of the border poll now. What can people do to persuade unionism of 
the merits of both a poll and potentially, a united Ireland?
   
To conclude, what I would say is that the future border poll should probably be the end 
of a process in which the institutional, the cultural, the financial, the legitimacy questions, 
have been agreed by all parties and by the sovereign governments, and that would imply 
a very long drawn out process; and that is even if everybody was in agreement. How can 
that be done especially if there is widespread unionist boycott, a protest about what they 
might see, as similar to nationalism in 1973, as a pre-ordained outcome. And that’s why 
looking at the maths really helps us, with looking at the present and at the future; it’s an 
ironic inversion of sentiment effectively that we’re facing now. 
PRESENTATION 2: 
PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR ‘CONCURRENT 
REFERENDUMS’
Prof Colin Harvey, Professor of Human Rights Law, Queen’s University Belfast
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I am going to make three points: 
1. There is a lot of talk about the Good Friday Agreement, and what the Agreement 
was for and about. One thing to underline is the idea behind the entire peace process 
was not to marginalise or exile these questions to the periphery, but to bring them 
into the mainstream of constitutional politics.  We cannot stress that enough. These 
questions must not be marginalised, exiled or written off as dangerous, corrosive or 
divisive. Academic events like this, the research that is going on around these islands 
at the moment, the various forms of engagement, are all part of this process of making 
this as boring and tedious as humanly possible; of attempting, as difficult as it may be, 
to normalise and de-escalate aspects of this conversation. Why? Because there is a 
desperate need to bring it into the mainstream.  
Connected to that point, and I do not need to tell anybody who lives here, people 
have a right to hold a view on the constitutional future of this region. There are various 
protections around that, and it is vital that this is recognised. So, what we are having 
today is a legitimate conversation that has been endorsed in referendums on the island 
of Ireland (22 May 1998), is a normal part of the constitutional legal orders of both states, 
and is underpinned by international law. Nothing that is being discussed here is stepping 
outside the constitutional or legal mainstream.
2. It is particularly important at this time that people pay attention to what is being said 
and what is not being said in the civic, political, and other discussions that are happening 
on the island. We are all human and can easily caricature other people’s positions, but it 
seems to me that in the face of Brexit, in the face of the coercive and forced removal of 
this region from the European Union that what is remarkable is that the conversation is 
couched in the dignified language of planning and preparing for these referendums. 
There is a tendency to caricature that position as a call for a ‘border poll next Wednesday’. 
I cannot hear anybody calling for a ‘border poll next Wednesday’. What I can hear is 
people making the case for adequate planning and preparation in advance of the votes. 
Even the term ‘border poll’ is a rather unhelpful way of describing it. It suggests, for 
example, that there will only be one vote; it suggests that the only conversation we are 
having is about the border; and both those things are plainly not true. 
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‘Concurrent referendums’ may well just be boring enough a term for the boring 
conversation I want to encourage, but we need to think about the language that we 
use. The discussion at the moment really is about a civic and political narrative and 
conversation aimed at planning for the future and preparing for referendums. What is 
striking is that in the face of unsettling events, proposals and suggestions to mitigate, 
deal with or address what is happening to this place have emerged. That needs to be 
underlined again. In other words, people are putting forward constructive proposals for 
how conversations might be taken forward. Very few people I hear in the narrative on 
this island are standing up and calling for referendums and sitting down. What I hear, 
for example, in organisations like Ireland’s Future, and others, are calls for an all island 
Citizens’ Assembly, proposals for having a Minister in the Irish Government charged 
with responsibility for taking this work forward, proposals around an Oireachtas joint 
committee to examine the details of all this, and a variety of civic and other initiatives to 
work out what this means.  All done in order to encourage the debate, in the face of the 
mounting evidence that, over the course of the next decade, it is reasonably likely that 
the union with Britain may be coming to an end. In that context, there is a constitutional 
responsibility on all of us to engage universities and others in prudential planning. 
3. Do not leave it to the Secretary of State. This simply must not be left to a British 
Secretary of State to take forward. I am aware of the content of the Northern Ireland Act, 
and I know the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement, and the law in relation to all 
that. But we are talking about a constitutional question of such magnitude, it cannot be 
left to the Secretary of State alone. There has already been a case on the legal provisions; 
many of us know what that has to say, including on the flexibility the Secretary of State 
has.  There may be further litigation here, and also further litigation in the south of Ireland, 
around the constitutional provisions there. There needs to be proper civic and bilateral 
management of this process. In addition to the civic initiatives, there must be robust 
Irish-British intergovernmental management of where this is going next. It needs to be on 
the agenda of the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, and it also must be on the 
agenda of EU and UK discussions in terms of the future relationship. A framework and 
a time frame are needed and that has to be set out at the intergovernmental level.  The 
process may look like the one that took us from the Downing Street Declaration to the 
Good Friday Agreement in 1998; a Joint Declaration from both governments, a framework 
document in a British-Irish context, as much clarity and certainty front loaded, framed in 
the way the Good Friday Agreement envisaged in terms of relationships around these 
islands. Even then we must acknowledge that there is a risk of a boycott. One way to try 
to mitigate that risk is to make sure the debate is framed in a more inclusive way, involving 
both governments and political parties, but also including the European Union, because 
the European Union will be impacted, as will its member states. 
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If the outcome is reunification, it will be a managed and agreed transition that will take 
place over time, agreed by both governments, with input from the European Union and 
other international actors; it will be framed by the Agreement, and the protections that 
carry forward, relevant international standards, and existing  guarantees. 
Just to finish where I started, it is reasonably likely - based on existing evidence - that 
the Union with Britain may be coming to an end over the next decade. This initiative, and 
others, are part of a process of sensible and prudential management, within which human 
rights have to be at the centre. 
For the Irish Government, this island and these islands, it is time that we all started to get 
reunification ready.    
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PRESENTATION 3: 
THE ROUTE FROM A BORDER POLL TO A UNITED IRELAND
Alan Whysall, University College London
My career background was 35 years in the Northern Ireland office, off and on. In 
particular, I was involved with the preparation of the Good Friday Agreement, including 
the constitutional parts. And always very struck by how little discussion there was on 
constitutional issues in those negotiations. 
So, though the Agreement lays down the beginnings of a framework, I was always conscious 
how much it left undecided about the route to a United Ireland, or what it looks like.
And yet, people have been more and more talking about a border poll and a United 
Ireland. Some of them English instant experts on Ireland in the May cabinet who started 
implicitly threatening border polls, which struck me as playing with fire. But there were 
also some people – Enda Kenny among them – who suggested the Agreement offered a 
route to a United Ireland. Which it doesn’t, it offers only a principle and a trigger.
That led me to discussions in the Constitution Unit and the production of the paper last 
year about a border poll. It was fairly unexplored territory – though Colin and Mark Bassett 
beat me by a couple of weeks with their paper.
And since then we have put together the Working Group composed largely of academics 
from this university, including Cathy, QUB, and two in Dublin, as well as UCL. Like the 
paper, we have no position on whether there should be a border poll or not, or whether 
there should be a United Ireland, only a concern that there is sensible process mapped 
out to cover the eventualities.
Nevertheless, I’m speaking in a personal capacity, and what I say is not necessarily what 
the working group will conclude.
In summary
People need to adapt to the new reality where a border poll is perfectly possible, if 
probably not imminent, and we have to be prepared.
But also to recognise the route to United Ireland thereafter will be a very long and 
complicated one, full of really difficult decisions and risks of things going wrong. We need 
to plan for it carefully.
And an electorate, North and South, may ultimately not be up for risky strategies, 
particularly ones that put at risk their own well-being.
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Questions round a border poll do need to be addressed. It is the process we have in the 
Agreement, is arguably the cornerstone of it, without which the Agreement is liable to 
collapse, and it is not impossible we shall find ourselves in a position where under the 
Agreement a poll has to be called, before long. This morning’s survey suggests not, others 
suggest otherwise, and we are still at the mercy of seismic developments on Scottish 
independence and perhaps Brexit. 
It hasn’t at any time been properly been thought through. Tracing the history back, the 
idea of a border poll does not seem to have arisen out of any developed thought about 
how it might work, if ever implemented, and provide a smooth route to Irish unity.
It was an expedient to try to resolve political and violent conflict. And it eventually played 
its part in doing so. But there wasn’t much thought about how it might actually work.
So in the early 1970s the British government hoped to take the border out of politics by 
holding a poll. The poll happened. It did nothing at that stage perceptibly to diminish the 
conflict, but holding further polls was provided for in the new constitution of Northern 
Ireland in 1973. They were set out in a purely negative form: Northern Ireland would 
not cease to be part of the UK without approval in a border poll. But there was an 
understanding that if such a poll showed a majority for Irish unity, the situation would 
radically change. Not that anyone thought it would.
Constitutional status was I believe discussed in the 1991-2 talks, and certainly in various 
dialogues, including those between John Hume and Gerry Adams, that underlay the 
Downing Street Declaration of 1993. The Declaration made clear that a decision whether 
or not to have Irish unity was a matter for people in the island, voting in the North and in 
the south, and no one else.
Constitutional status wasn’t discussed at all in the negotiations that led to the Good Friday 
Agreement. The 1993 principles were simply adopted, and people argued about much 
more immediate differences.
And to the principle of the 1993 Declaration, was added the trigger: the Secretary of State 
must call a poll if he thinks a majority voting in it would favour a United Ireland (though the 
law permits him to call one at any time).
As set out in the agreement it is a binary choice. There had been discussion, for example 
in the New Ireland Forum, about halfway houses, like joint sovereignty. There is none of 
that, apparently, here.
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This is what we have, it is the cornerstone of the Agreement, we have to work with it. 
But it poses a particular challenge because it is in marked contrast with much else in the 
Agreement, which puts the emphasis on consensus. 
The Agreement itself was approved by consensus: a majority of unionists and the majority 
of nationalists. And that is how key decisions in the power-sharing institutions have to be 
reached. 
(The exact formulation is possibly now growing outmoded, in the light of voting patterns 
which suggest the growth of a centre ground, and surveys that suggest a majority no 
longer identifying one of those two camps. But the principle retains all its validity).
Because it has been the received wisdom since the 1970s that government in Northern 
Ireland will not work except on the basis of substantial acceptance in all the main parts of 
the community. 
And so, the questions raised by Seamus Mallon about whether 50% +1 will yield a 
functioning and harmonious new Ireland need to be addressed. 
It would of course be hard to take on the binary formulation directly, so as to change the 
Agreement: so much history and politics underlie it, and trying to get consensus to change 
it seems fanciful. The Agreement can however develop, as it has already.
The conclusion I come to looking at the prospects for unity is that if we get into a 
border poll, we need a very careful, and inevitably lengthy, process and an atmosphere 
of constructive politics, including a good relationship between the British and Irish 
governments  if we want the island, following a border poll, to be harmonious and 
ultimately successful. 
And the cause of harmony, and perhaps indeed the cause of Irish unity, might actually 
be furthered by looking at halfway houses, rather than confining ourselves to the binary 
choice of constitutional status.
As I said, very little is laid down in the Agreement about either the route to a United 
Ireland, or what it looks like: beyond the principle, the trigger of the border poll, and 
slightly vague provision for “concurrent” consent in the South, after which the two 
Governments would bring forward proposals for unity. We should regard that as statutory 
shorthand: nobody imagines that the two governments can get into a room and draw up a 
plan together without talking to other people.
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But there is no guidance for example on how the Secretary of State should go about 
exercising his powers. There is a discretion to call a northern poll at any time, but he 
has to do so if it is likely that a majority would vote for unity. How does he decide that? If 
there were a majority in the Assembly that voted in favour of a poll, it would be hard for 
him to resist. If there is a succession of reliable opinion polls that showed a majority, if 
slender – 52 to 48 is a mandate for anything, after all – then he might at least need good 
countervailing evidence to resist. Opinion polling hardly offers consistent guidance at 
present.
But there is wide agreement that we have to go in to a poll with propositions on the table. 
As Gerry Adams said last year, perhaps impertinently commenting on experience in the 
adjacent island, it is stupid to have a referendum without a plan. It would seem sensible 
for there to be a period of years for plans to develop, if they had not been developed. 
Plans for unity; one would assume there would be an alternative offer on the part of 
unionism, which might or might not include the British government, for a Northern Ireland 
in which people of nationalist outlook might feel more comfortable.
But the difficult question is how do you get unionism into the shaping of a United Ireland. 
We run up here against one of the really serious practical difficulties. There is talk of 
involving unionism in discussions before a border poll. It seems to me fanciful to imagine 
you can get political unionism to participate in drawing up such plans before a United 
Ireland is absolutely inevitable. They will not divide their time between campaigning 
forcefully against a United Ireland, and specifying what it ought to look like. 
I don’t see how you get round this with Citizens’ Assemblies or other such consultation 
techniques.
If there is to be a negotiation with unionism, and it is hard to see a peaceful and 
harmonious state emerging without it, it has to take place after the decision in principle. 
Perhaps with a formal consensus threshold built in to the design, as in the 1996 to 1998 
Agreement talks.
But that creates the conundrum of permitting a further Unionist veto. It is the best we can 
come up with, therefore, that failing agreement a set of default provisions for basic unity 
come into play?
Such a negotiation, of course, and the associated preparations for a United Ireland, 
potentially needs to last for a period of some years. The questions to be dealt with – 
institutional, financial, and so on – are enormous.
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Associated with this is the further question of how many referendums are to be held. 
If there is to be post agreement negotiation, I find it hard to see how potentially very 
substantial amendments to the Irish Constitution – the current Taoiseach spoke last year 
of the need for a whole new Constitution – can realistically be legislated for in advance – 
and therefore there may well be two Dublin referendums. In which case, especially if you 
are adopting a new constitution for the whole of Ireland, it is hard to see how a second 
referendum in Northern Ireland can be avoided.
We are still discussing this issue in the Working Group, and it is not my home territory, so 
I speak with diffidence. But if the Constitution is to be amended, a referendum is needed 
for that. And if it is to take place in the South, it is hard to see that a referendum in the 
North, shortly to become part of the state government under the Constitution, can be 
avoided either.
All this is potentially a process lasting over a period of years. And one of enormous 
delicacy, which could easily collapse into chaos, which inevitably in the context is going to 
lead to threats by some of violence, which may have a measure of support.
To reduce the risks of this, we need at all stages to maintain a spirit of constructive 
politics. And a good relationship between the two governments.
We have not had those for most of the last three years. The position improved a great 
deal on 13 January, which owed a lot to the working relationship between Julian Smith 
and the Irish Foreign Minister. But one is gone and the other will be going, and how much 
concern there is at the centre of the British government for maintaining both is not readily 
apparent.
What concretely should we do now? I do come back to the need for these issues, the 
process and the destination, to be discussed. 
There are some in unionism who are still maintaining that it is destabilising even to talk 
about border polls. I can’t see how that is the case: people are talking about them, and 
unionism would logically be focusing on the strategic imperative of persuading people it 
had a better alternative to a United Ireland.
And for those who favour a United Ireland, it is worth looking at the strategy. A big bang 
may not be the best plan.
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And in the south, though it appears at present a majority of the electorate would welcome 
an early border poll, the appetite for importing conflict, and drawing attention away from 
housing and health and other such day-to-day issues, may ultimately be limited.
Given the risks of the process, my take is that someone seriously looking for a United 
Ireland might reflect on moving in smaller steps and more consensually, overcoming the 
divisions imposed by Brexit, East West as well as north-south, looking to do worthwhile 
things together rather than apart, working the existing north-south and east-west 
machinery to their full potential.
But we may well come to the crunch, and the poll: and we need to be prepared for that 
as well.
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I am working with Eilish at the moment, so I’ll give an introduction to some of the issues, 
and then Eilish will talk you through some of our concrete plans in relation to those issues. 
Loyalist community activist Jamie Bryson recently used the term ‘the persuaders’ to 
describe those commentators and scholars who make an argument for unification or 
envisage it.  He understood that process of persuasion in the fashion of the laws of 
attraction; you think it, you say it, you believe it and it manifests itself.  Now, those who 
oppose unification, of course, could also be called ‘persuaders’, persuading us that the 
constitutional status quo is better than any transition. Regardless, we know, as Colin set 
out for us, debates are emerging, narratives are coming and if things move in the way we 
think they will, we are going to have different kinds of debates; some will have evidence, 
some will be divisive, some will be nasty, some will hark back to the past, some will 
rehash the past. But we do know we will have a public sphere where these debates 
are happening.
What Eilish and I are interested in is where are women going to be located within this 
public sphere of debate. We know from our combined historical analysis as feminists, 
that during constitutional change, women tend to be marginalised. That is our history. 
No-one in this room would say it, but someone might say those are the old days, you’re 
talking about an old form of nationalism. Nationalism has reinvented itself, all those others, 
women, LGBT, all those excluded others that the nation’s values were harnessed around. 
All of that has changed. Those identities now represent progress. Now they seem to 
reflect the normative aspirations and principles of the nation. Things have changed, and 
we don’t have to worry about these exclusions anymore. 
Also, women were not at the forefront 
of politics the way they are now. Women 
are not following politics anymore, 
they are leaders. They have power, 
they have influence within the political 
parties. So surely now, women’s 
interests are going to be represented 
in new ways, in modern ways, we can 
forget about the past. Unfortunately, 
we don’t unhinge ourselves from our 
gendered past so easily. 
PRESENTATION 4: 
THE LOCATION OF WOMEN IN REFERENDUM DEBATES
Dr Fidelma Ashe, Transitional Justice Institute and ASPS, Ulster University
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I want to try to explain this, with reference to an article by Elena Bergia. She engaged in a 
recent study with politically motivated ex-prisoners. What she found was very interesting.  
She found that, unlike women politically motivated ex-prisoners, these men possess 
something called seductive capital. So, when the women came out of prison, the women 
came out of prison.  When the men were released from prison, they found they were 
exceptionally attractive to the opposite sex. As one of Bergia’s respondents said, when 
the men were released from prison, ‘the women were mad for them’.  This illustrates a 
really important point, and the point is that seductive capital goes beyond mere affairs of 
the heart. Journalists, politicians and academics will court the views and opinions of some 
groups more than others. In other words, whatever we’re going into, whatever shape it 
is, or whatever materialises, we do know one thing; each social group is going into these 
debates from a completely different historical position. 
So, what can we do about it?  That’s a really big question, but we can ask a few questions. 
Something else we know from Bergia’s study is if you look, there was no great patriarchal 
plan, there was no headquarters saying let’s create this gender difference; and it’s the 
same thing that’s going to be involved in this debate.  There will be no grand patriarchal 
plan, there’ll be no group of people saying keep the women out. It’s not going to work 
that way. The power relations are much finer than that. But what we’ll get is the same 
patriarchal effects. 
So, what might we need to think about when we are thinking about women’s participation, 
inclusion, I haven’t even found the right word yet, for what we’re hoping to talk about 
more and explore? I think first of all, if we look back at history, we’ll note that women’s 
participation hasn’t been a priority; I think that is one thing we have to look at first of all. 
Where do different groups sit on the hierarchy of priorities? And if they’re sitting down 
here, we know what’s going to happen. 
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Secondly, women can so easily, especially in this culture with all our modernising and 
progressive change around identity politics, become a signifier for progressive change 
and an emblem for participatory politics in someone else’s argument.  What that means 
is that women yet again have utility for someone else’s argument. Women need to be 
able to inform those narratives. They cannot simply be signifiers between nationalist or 
other groups. We’ve a history of women being utilised in ways that benefit other groups 
but as many of us feminists have noted, that utilisation is rarely accompanied by any 
redistribution of gender power and influence. We need to ask questions about how can 
women be invited into debates? And if they are invited in, what are the terms of that 
invitation, really? Can women create their own spaces? We know, in the Scottish case, that 
women had multiple entry points into the debates. One of the ways they entered those 
debates was to create their own autonomous spaces. The other question is, can women 
push their way in? And if they’re going to push their way in, if they’re going to have to 
push their way into debates, what kind of resources do they need, and I’m not just talking 
about economic resources, I’m talking about resources from scholars, academics and 
activists.  Can we provide any resources? The first thing I suppose, the most important 
thing for all of us if we’re working on this issue is that we ourselves include women, 
beyond the symbolic, and understand that if we’re using terms like human rights, and 
if we’re using terms like autonomy etc., those same terms apply to women. And if the 
internal dynamics of change don’t recognise that, then all of those terms become 
very partial. 
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How do we have a conversation about a referendum that includes people who live in 
marginalised and disadvantaged districts across the north? These districts experienced 
around 80% of the conflict related fatalities and most of the ex-prisoner families live in 
these areas. References in the media and in academic articles to ‘divided communities’ 
are frequently a shorthand reference to Belfast’s mainly nationalist and unionist working 
class districts. At interfaces, such as those in North Belfast, these districts are often 
divided, literally, by peace walls and gates. However, in common with Northern Ireland’s 
wider population, people living in these districts have had very different experiences 
of the UK state, of union within the UK and very different experiences of the conflict. 
In this workshop my aim is to dispel any assumption that constitutional conversations 
in grassroots communities will be more contentious than elsewhere. Community 
organisations in these districts have long experience of managing difficult conversations 
and damaging disputes.   
Constitutional conversations, such as the one we are having today between experts, are 
vital. They take place formally and informally between economists, lawyers, social policy 
advocates, educationalists, health professionals, businesses and many others. The question 
I address today is, how do we have conversations - genuine, well-informed, participatory 
conversations, about a referendum that will include the views and experiences of people in 
disadvantaged districts? These people have expertise in their own lives and locations. 
This is knowledge that should be fed into island wide conversations. 
PRESENTATION 5: 
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT A BORDER POLL: FLASH CARDS
Eilish Rooney, Transitional Justice Institute and ASPS, Ulster University
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Disadvantaged districts will be areas that are most directly affected by the prospect of a 
referendum as well as by its outcome. Inclusive, respectful and informed conversations 
are critical. For that reason, as a member of the Constitutional Conversations Group, and 
drawing on my past experience of community education, I designed a framework for 
grassroots conversations as a way to inform and prepare for the referendum whenever it 
will be held.  
In Scotland, the publication of Scotland’s Future, was one way that the population 
was prepared to have genuine, well-informed deliberations ahead of the referendum. 
However, at a hefty 316 pages, reading the document requires dedication and explanation 
(the Q&A appendix is an excellent example of a readable and pragmatic approach). 
The population in Northern Ireland was prepared for the referendum on the 1998 
Agreement by the distribution to every household of a copy of the Agreement. At just 35 
pages, with lots of open spaces, the document is accessible and readable. It sets out the 
structure and substance of future relationships within Northern Ireland; the North - South 
arrangements, and constitutional affairs across these islands. People participating in the 
1998 referendum were well and succinctly informed. The 1998 NI Act that gave effect to 
the Agreement is a different reading experience altogether but it came later.   
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Setting aside, for the moment, matters of the full implementation of the 1998 NI Act, it 
would be a tremendous achievement if at some stage in the future, ahead of an Irish unity 
- UK union referendum, we could have a roadmap document put to the voters that was as 
readable and accessible as the Agreement; as ambitious and inclusive, and as concerned 
with rights and equality; ideally the document would set out timeframes, stages, options 
and outcomes. This could provide a link to a more detailed, more Scotland’s Future type 
document containing details.   
I fully believe we can have inclusive, civic, preparatory conversations ahead of and 
alongside the work required to produce these documents. One of the things that I have 
undertaken as a member of the Constitutional Conversations Group is to explore ways to 
have preparatory conversations. Adaptable, participatory methods have been effectively 
used in the past to enable structured, informative, inclusive and respectful dialogue 
(Transitional Justice Grassroots Toolkit, 2016). The methods work best if participants 
adapt the framework for their own purposes and take ownership of the conversation. 
Topics can be added to suit the participants’ concerns and circumstances. Drawing on 
Toolkit experience, I designed four flash cards for the purpose of holding grassroots 
conversations about the referendum. The cards are called, Constitutional 
Conversation Cards.
The Constitutional Conversation Cards I’m about to show you are the result of some 
work already carried out with women from a cross-section of loyalist and republican 
communities. The women tested a set of pilot conversation cards about the referendums 
(provided for in the 1998 Agreement). The women tested the cards and gave feedback. 
Their feedback sent me back to the drawing board to redo the cards. I’ve redesigned 
them several times since on the basis of feedback from helpful users and colleagues. 
Fidelma and I plan to use these cards with women from ten community organisations. 
With a funding grant, we are planning to engage with around 100 women in constitutional 
conversations in 2021.
I’d be delighted, if you’re interested, if you can provide feedback on what I’m about to 
do; tell me what you think does and doesn’t work. An experienced facilitator could do a 
great job, I believe, using the Constitutional Conversation Cards to discuss practicalities 
with regard to referendum questions, ages of voters, and much more including the local 
implications of leaving the European Union. 
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These are the four cards A - D.  
Each Flash Card has some conversation topics on the front and information, questions and 
activity prompts on the back. The cards can be adjusted to suit the interests of different 
groups: 
Card A: gets the conversation going with some information to encourage everyone to 
take part. 
Card B: puts hopes and fears up front and poses pragmatic questions: what matters most? 
what concerns do you have? what do you need to know?
Card C: considers preparation, timeframes and who should be involved at different stages 
Participants are asked to consider what they themselves can do by way of preparation 
and participation.
Card D: closes the constitutional conversation that lasts around an hour or two.
The cards provide a facilitated structure for an inclusive conversation. The process begins 
by asserting the importance of everyone having a say, being listened to, using information 
and exchanging views.
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Card A begins with Constitutional Conversations, Have your say.  So, imagine us in 
this workshop using the ‘Have Your Say’ card together or with a community group or 
organisation. To begin, we might take a look at the GFA and what it has to say about 
constitutional relationships within RoI and between RoI and the UK. This first card 
frames the ‘having your say’ process by posing the question: what is the purpose of a 
referendum? The repetition of ‘Have your Say’, at the bottom of the card, reiterates the 
theme of the whole conversation. 
When this first card was tested in practice, you might be surprised, as I was, by how little 
people remembered about what was in the Agreement and also how interested the 
women were in reading and discussing it. 
This next slide shows the back of Card A.
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So, as you see, the reverse of Card A has topics of conversation by way of information 
about the Agreement and how it was reached; that it was deposited with the United 
Nations; how it changed constitutional relationships between RoI and the UK, in that 
Ireland dropped its territorial claim to NI, and the Agreement provided for referendums, 
the outcome of which will be decided by majorities voting, at the same time in each 
jurisdiction. 
A short definition of a constitution as a legal document that also articulates a people’s 
hopes is a way of acknowledging that hopes belong to everyone whatever their political 
views. This grassroots conversation doesn’t lead to a place where anyone’s hopes are 
ignored and left behind. Although, as has been said earlier, the conversation is wider than 
any workshop or local conversation and will carry on beyond it. Acknowledging hopes, 
fears and frustrations is not a way to stop dialogue but a way to secure respect, inclusive 
participation and recognition of different views and experiences.
This grassroots conversation allows referendum disagreements to surface in valuable 
ways. Exchanges may be divisive and may expose complex issues for which there are no 
ready answers. But bringing disagreement, hope and fear to the surface involves people 
in articulating and thinking through matters that are important to them at a particular time. 
The referendum will eventually decide a course of action that requires this preparation 
and clear information about the decision to be taken.   
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So, while the Flash Cards encourage everyone to have their say, the activity prompts at 
the bottom of each card suggests a way to do this with a facilitator. In this case, individuals 
may use post-it notes ahead of having a chat in small groups. Then everyone comes 
together and the post-its and flip chart call outs are displayed for everyone to see. The 
objective is to enable everyone to give their view on the substance of Card A and to have 
their view made visible to others.
The next slide shows Card B What matters most about a referendum? It asks participants 
to consider hopes, fears and concerns. And also, to think about the action they may take 
to advance hopes, counter fears and address concerns.  
Card B front 
Card B: What matters most about a referendum? What are people’s hopes and fears, their 
concerns?   And what action is available to them, to counter or address their concerns?  
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The back of Card B asks participants to consider hopes and fears within a short-term 
and future timeframe. The list of concerns comprises some topics that may evoke both 
hopes and concerns shared by participants. The list can be added to. Some people may 
name personal, community and societal issues that are not listed. The point is to enable 
participants to feel free to talk about a future that we face together and maybe to think 
about the prospect in different ways. The agency or action prompt is for participants to 
record what they can do and what they want to see done. Post-its and call out charts are 
again visible for reflection. 
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So, while the Flash Cards encourage everyone to have their say, the activity prompts at 
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The back of Card B asks participants consider hopes and fears within a short-term and 
future timeframe. The list of concerns comprises some topics that may evoke both 
hopes and concerns shared by participants. The list can be added to. Some people may 
name personal, community and societal issues that are not listed. The point is to enable 
participants to feel free to talk about a future that we face together and maybe to think 
about the prospect in different ways. The agency or action prompt is for participants to 
record what they can do and what they want to see done. Post-its and call out charts are 
again visible for reflection. 
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Card C front
Card C back
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The theme of Card C is preparation. On the reverse of the Card, questions are asked about 
what should happen when. Once again, notes on deliberations are posted for all to see. 
The last card, Card D closes with referendum practicalities including options as to the form 
of question to be asked, the age of voters and the timing. Once again, this card closes 
with posting views for all to see. 
Card D front
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Card D back
A facilitated Constitutional Card Conversation workshop closes with everyone reviewing 
the notes posted during the session and perhaps with some call outs on expectations, 
what happened that was unexpected, and what was learned as well as decided by 
participants. 
In conclusion, I return to the question that I started with: why shouldn’t people in North 
Belfast’s Duncairn, Mount Vernon and Tiger’s Bay districts benefit from participation in 
constitutional conversations? They have as much right as the rest of us to be involved in 
these deliberations. The views of people living in urban marginalised districts of Belfast 
and elsewhere, will be decisive to the referendum outcome. Preparation and information, 
such as we are gathering at this workshop today, will be crucial to the whole process. 
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Question 1. How do you resolve the difficulty of addressing risk factors that go with two 
sets of referendums, if for example the first part is agreed, but not the second, and does 
this lead to being trapped in a loop?
Alan: it needs to be thought through, in the light of political realities.
One proposal I put forward in the original paper  that you would go into the first 
referendum, and if it was agreed in both parts of Ireland, there would be a set of default 
positions for a united Ireland which might be a mirror image but giving both sides 
something to do better on in negotiation.  This whole process is full of conundrums. 
Question 2. A conundrum and risks – do you want to construct conditions for discussion 
of a referendum to be in place beforehand, or do you envisage the referendum process 
one where those conditions will be produced?  
Fidelma: I think there’s no clean-cut process, or utopian model. The most important aspect 
of this is whether we start to move in the direction of trying to articulate perspectives; 
what is important to me, is whichever process takes place, women must be allowed to 
participate in those conversations. But I can’t predict what might be the best transitional 
process. 
Colin: I think the process needs to be front loaded, because planning and preparation 
means teasing out the problems and questions in advance.  There is a possibility of 
either unionism or nationalism opting out of or boycotting this border poll; either side can 
boycott because of, for example, unhappiness with the question or general mistrust of the 
British government.  
If we respect the rights in the Agreement, of each side holding their constitutional 
positions robustly, you cannot expect Unionism and loyalism to help design a united 
Ireland. But what we can expect is for Unionism and loyalism to prepare a proposition 
around why remaining in the United Kingdom is the preferable option.
Preparation is needed around the various options. What is the argument to people in 
this region in terms of a reunified Ireland? Is that tweaking the current constitution to 
accommodate the Agreement, or is it a new constitution? This all needs to be thought 
through before the referendums happen. These propositions need to be based in human 
rights, and be as generous as possible, in order to avoid repeating some of the mistakes 
of the past.   This is a contested society; this process will include debate, and democracy 
is about robust dialogue and engagement. The threat of force that sometimes arises in 
this argument needs to be challenged and managed; this will be highly contested and, of 
course, we do not want anyone to die in the process. But it is a debate that we really need 
to have and prepare for. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
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People need to come to the table with clear propositions; that is why preparation and 
planning are essential.  It needs to be a civic conversation, an uncomfortable conversation 
in different communities, but it also must be a British and Irish intergovernmental 
conversation about designing the parameters, not leaving the question of ‘who gets to 
vote’ to the Secretary of State; but for both governments in a calm and measured way, to 
design a credible process, have a time frame and let people decide.  But you cannot rule 
out people walking away from all that as well.
The outcome can go either way.  It is not predetermined, and there is nothing inevitable 
about the outcome of possible referendums.  People have looked at Brexit, they are trying 
to learn the lessons, to use responsible language in planning for what comes next.  In the 
context of the forced removal of this region from the European Union, which I recently 
heard a politician describe as ‘constitutional violence’, the language has to be of sensible 
and prudential management for referendums that will come. 
Alan: I don’t think calling a referendum is going to galvanise everyone into behaving 
responsibly, at all. There’s a real possibility of the opposite.  But I think there is a 
responsibility on civic society and persuade people to move in constitutional channels, 
as it has done in the past with the 1998 referendum.
Question 3. UCD has established a group looking at Constitutional Futures. There are 
triangulated structures, and a need for engagement in each direction, the Union / EU / 
United Ireland.
Richard: the outcomes of Brexit mean that Unionism has no allies in Westminster; there 
may be an existential dread which makes this conversation even more difficult. This is 
an incredibly destabilising moment for unionists. Based on the Welsh experience, there 
needs to be (academic) discussions here on what does Britishness mean? Where is the 
Union going? 
Jane: the whole situation is so fluid; for example, in Scotland with a possibility of a second 
referendum there; that will have a huge impact on the Union.  As well, a lot of the ties here 
are across to Scotland, as opposed to England. 
There are conversations needed in the south. 
[Colin: there have been a number of polls in the south, showing a comfortable majority for 
this happening]
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Eilish: That call for unionists to have conversations has already gone out.  Peter Robinson 
made a speech (at the 2018 McGill Summer School in Glenties) calling on Unionists to be 
discussing these issues; and more recently Billy Hutchinson, former combatant and ex-
prisoner, called for conversations that unionists should be having. I find that encouraging. 
I love listening to how conversation levels change; I think grassroots conversations 
matter and are crucial. They are like mushrooms; there is underground work that happens 
whenever local conversations occur. It’s where these conversations are happening that 
matters. We’re all here today, and there’s a lot of interest in having these conversations. 
Constitutional conversations are an opportunity for union and unity options to be 
promoted at a Féile event, on reunification, Dawn Purvis said, there’s talk of a national 
health service in Ireland, we’ve got one, no need. Now that’s a really good sell. This isn’t 
just a nationalist conversation. 
Cathy: unionism have not been comfortable articulating their ideas publicly; and the 
conversations about what a referendum process would look like are not happening, 
publicly.  My reading of engagement with some senior loyalist politicians is that they’re 
happy to have the conversation privately, but not publicly.
Fidelma: I am incredibly sceptical of these binaries; nationalism depends on a sense 
that there is unity within nationalism, and that unity is maintained; but there is not one 
homogenous community of nationalists.  If you open up the constituencies within these 
communities in terms of rights, you’re going to get a much more complex picture of 
how people think. The binary view of the two communities is a fiction and depends on 
excluding certain others. 
Colin: what is striking, is that this conversation, both here and in Scotland, and to a certain 
extent in Wales, is about a rejection of narrow nationalism.  It is about the loss of being 
part of a transnational, pluralist European project. From a unionist perspective: What is the 
Union for? There needs to be a much clearer articulation about what the Union is for, what 
it is about and there needs to be a greater confidence in articulating that, and it needs 
to be substantively informed. Unionists need to flesh out the argument for people, who 
are open to persuasion, to be persuaded. The option of a return to the European Union 
has dramatically changed the debate here;  we will see how the Protocol and the special 
arrangements work out. But you cannot avoid the reality that Irish reunification now 
becomes a return option, with the potential to appeal to the ‘remain constituency’. Ireland 
may or may not look like the better bet, in the longer term, for many people here. The field 
has opened up post-Brexit. 
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Alan: what is the impact on the unionist psyche of the betrayal in the Withdrawal 
Agreement when they thought they had friends in the Tory back benches, and the 
increasing signs that England is only interested in England? Generally, within younger 
generations of unionists, there are profound shifts in outlook. 
Question 4. What would you see as just, legitimate and inclusive participation would you 
see in a referendum? And specifically, for a European citizen? Who takes part in the flash 
card conversations? What did they say? Would you consider doing them in the Republic? 
Eilish: I am actively looking for invitations to try out the Flash Cards, so would welcome 
invitations from the south; the work that Fidelma and I are planning is to use these current 
Flash Cards with around 100 women in different communities. But in the group of loyalist 
and republican women where I was listening, the women were robust and clear, and 
spoke about things women share concerns about. That’s not to minimise differences 
because people were very clear about differences and what was best for them.  We didn’t 
get into any imaginary detailed futures, but the Constitutional Conversations group plan 
an International Women’s Day event, which will encourage participants to do just that 
[Note: due to COVID19 this did not happen].
On the question of diverse, just and inclusive participation, that is the great opportunity 
the cards allow, people say very regular and radical things, and I have no doubt that 
people would say, why can’t a European citizen living here vote. I have mentioned it as 
a topic in one of the cards; but where we would have to pay attention, is, for example, 
Travellers are not mentioned in this. 
Fidelma: we want everybody to participate and want unionists to engage; some senior 
unionists don’t want to have it discussed, so how easy has that been?  Eilish: it is very 
interesting to be a woman, because women’s views don’t usually count, so women’s 
groups get away with doing things, which male groups, ex-prisoner groups for example, 
might not. The discipline imposed on people around what they can and can’t do, hasn’t 
happened yet. 
Fidelma: I want to go back to this issue of difference. Once you recognise women 
are an excluded group, it’s like an onion. Once you peel the onion, there are all those 
layers of identity; so that brings in all those other groups of women with all their diverse 
cross cutting identities.  You’re going to be pushed, because you’ll always be excluding 
someone; so, you can never say this is women’s perspective, until you encompass 
different groups of women. But if no one is going to listen to you then that’s the 
biggest concern.
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Final questions. What’s the tipping point?  How are we addressing fragile masculinities – 
where is the space for looking at the role of masculinity in this? A prospectus, what should 
that look like? Who should/would prepare it? 
Fidelma: On the masculinity question (addressed in Fidelma’s book The New Politics of 
Masculinity) and threat of future violence, often the only people who care about the young 
men who might engage in violence, are the mothers. 
Alan: I don’t think the governments should be engaged in the preparation of a Prospectus; 
we should be developing civic leadership potential.
Cathy: Two prospectus, the proposition for this, and one for that? Perhaps an appointed 
group of interlocutors? A Commission?
Eilish: the back of the Scottish document, there’s a set of FAQs, which is a good approach; 
a document that manages to convey the complexity but in an accessible way. 
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Dr Fidelma Ashe, Transitional Justice Institute and ASPS, Ulster University
Fidelma Ashe is a Reader in politics and a member of the Transitional Justice Institute. 
She was an undergraduate at Queens University and was awarded a PhD in Political 
theory by Queens in 2000.She joined Ulster University in 2003 specialising in Critical 
Gender Studies and New Social Movement theory. She is author of The New Politics of 
Masculinity: Men, Power and Resistance (2007), published by Routledge, co-author of 
Contemporary Social and Political Theory: An Introduction (1999), published by Open 
University Press, and her forthcoming book Gender and Conflict Transformation in 
Northern Ireland: New Themes and Old Problems will be published by Routledge. She has 
written widely in the area of gender, ethno-nationalist conflict and conflict transformation. 
She was invited to become a member of an international feminist research team 
conducting research on the theme of ‘Women and Post-Conflict Transformation: Lessons 
of the Past, Implications for the Future’ which received United States Institute of Peace 
funding in 2013.  She is currently Primary Investigator on the project LGBTQ Visions of 
Peace in a Society Emerging from Conflict which received funding from the AHRC in 2015.
Prof Brice Dickson, School of Law, Queen’s University of Belfast
Although he retired from full-time employment in the School of Law at Queen’s University 
in 2017, Emeritus Professor Brice Dickson still engages in legal research and commentary. 
In 2018 the third edition of his textbook Law in Northern Ireland was published by Hart 
Publishing. In 2019 his monograph entitled The Irish Supreme Court: Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives was published by Oxford University Press and his Writing the 
UK Constitution was published by Manchester University Press (and nominated for a 
Parliamentary Book Award).
 
2018-19 also saw the publication of two book chapters. One, ‘The Constitutional 
Governance of Counter-Terrorism’ was published as Chapter 2 of Counter-terrorism, 
Constitutionalism and Miscarriages of Justice: A Festschrift for Professor Clive Walker 
(Hart Publishing), co-edited by Genevieve Lennon, Colin King and Carole McCartney. 
The other, ‘Apex Courts and the Development of the Common Law’ was published as 
Chapter 2 of Apex Courts and the Common Law (University of Toronto Press), edited by 
Paul Daly. See too his 2019 report on the United Kingdom in a collection on Constitutional 
Asymmetry and Multinationalism, co-edited by Patricia Popelier and Maja Sahadžićto, 
published by Palgrave Macmillan, and a chapter on ‘Devolution in Northern Ireland’ for 
the 9th edition of The Changing Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2019), co-edited 
by Jeffrey Jowell and Colm O’Cinneide. A chapter on ‘Common Law Constitutional Rights 
at the Devolved Level’ will appear in Common Law Constitutional Rights, co-edited by 
Mark Elliott and Kirsty Hughes for Hart Publishing (2020). With the help of a Leverhulme 
Emeritus Fellowship Dickson is currently researching the impact of state-reporting 
mechanisms on the protection of human rights in the UK. He is also pursuing his interest 
in the concept of ‘fairness’ in in English law.
PARTICIPANTS
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Prof Cathy Gormley Heenan, Deputy Vice Chancellor, Ulster University
Professor Cathy Gormley-Heenan is Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research & External Affairs) at 
Ulster University and a Professor of Politics with research interests in the areas of political 
elites, peace processes, the politics of divided societies, public policy and governance. 
Until 2016, she was based in the School of Criminology, Politics & Social Policy at Ulster 
University where she was also Director of the Institute for Research in Social Sciences 
(IRiSS) from 2010-16. She holds a first class honours degree in politics from Queen’s 
University, Belfast and an MPhil in Modern Middle East Studies with Arabic from Oxford 
University before becoming a UK Kennedy Scholar in the J.F.K. School of Government 
and Public Policy at Harvard University, USA. She holds a PhD in History and International 
Affairs from Ulster University. She is the Chair of the Universities UK’s International Research 
Development Network as well as a member of the UK’s Kennedy Scholars Association. 
She serves as a Trustee, Director, Board Member or Advisor on a range of external bodies 
and organisations including Innovation Ulster Ltd; Northern Ireland Science Park Property 
Ltd; Catalyst Inc; Matrix - the Northern Ireland Science Industry Panel; the Scottish 
Parliament’s External Experts Panel; the ESRC’s UK in a Changing Europe Advisory Panel; 
and the UK government’s advisory body on EU Exit, Universities, Research and Innovation, 
among other things. Cathy is also a fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences.
Prof Colin Harvey, Professor of Human Rights Law, Queen’s University of Belfast
Colin Harvey is Professor of Human Rights Law in the School of Law, Queen’s University 
Belfast, a Fellow of the Senator George J Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security 
and Justice, and an Associate Fellow of the Institute of Irish Studies. He has served as 
Head of the Law School, a member of Senate, a Director of the Human Rights Centre, 
and as a Director of Research. Before returning to Queen’s in 2005 he was Professor 
of Constitutional and Human Rights Law at the University of Leeds. He has held visiting 
positions at the University of Michigan, Fordham University, and the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. He has taught on the George Washington University 
– Oxford University Summer School in International Human Rights Law, and on the 
international human rights programme at the University of Oxford. He is a member of 
the Academic Panel at Doughty Street Chambers, a Senior Research Associate, Refugee 
Law Initiative, School of Advanced Study, University of London, a member of the Gender 
Identity Panel (Northern Ireland) and member of the Equality and Diversity Forum Research 
Network. Professor Harvey was a member of the REF2014 Law sub-panel and a member of 
the REF2014 Equality and Diversity Advisory Panel. He has served as a Commissioner on 
the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, and as a member of the Northern Ireland 
Higher Education Council. He is the Editor of the Series Human Rights Law in Perspective 
(Hart-Bloomsbury) and is on the editorial boards of Human Rights Law Review, Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly and European Human Rights Law Review. He has written and taught 
extensively on human rights law and policy and recently led an ESRC funded project on the 
consequences of Brexit for Northern Ireland (https://brexitlawni.org/).
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He has undertaken a range of advisory roles, including as an invited expert at the Irish 
Convention on the Constitution on “The Right of Citizens Resident outside the State 
to Vote in Presidential Elections”, as a participant in UNHCR’s “Global Consultation on 
International Protection”, and as a consultant to the Global Commission on International 
Migration on “The Right to Leave in International Law”. He has provided evidence to, 
for example, the Scottish Affairs Committee, Westminster Parliament on the “Scottish 
Referendum”.
He is the General Editor of the Series Human Rights Law in Perspective (Hart-Bloomsbury 
Publishing) and is on the editorial boards of Human Rights Law Review, Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly and European Human Rights Law Review. His books include: Applying an 
International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: Rights and Resources 
(2014, Routledge, with Rory O’Connell et al.); Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law (2013, 
ed. Edward Elgar, with Satvinder Juss); Human Rights and Public Finance (2013, ed. Hart 
Publishing, with Aoife Nolan and Rory O’Connell); Rights in Divided Societies (2012 ed. 
Hart Publishing, with Alex Schwartz); Human Rights in the Community: Rights as Agents 
for Change (ed., 2005, Hart Publishing); Sanctuary in Ireland: Perspectives on Asylum Law 
and Policy (ed., with Ursula Fraser, 2003, Institute of Public Administration); Human Rights, 
Equality and Democratic Renewal in Northern Ireland (ed., 2001, Hart Publishing); 
Seeking Asylum in the UK: Problems and Prospects (2000, Cambridge University 
Press/Butterworths).
He has published articles in: European Human Rights Law Review, Human Rights Law 
Review, International Journal of Refugee Law, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Modern Law 
Review, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly,Cornell International Law Journal, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Policy & Politics, Journal of Law and Society, Social and Legal 
Studies and Public Law, among others. He has been guest editor of several journal 
collections published in: International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Journal 
of Law and Society;Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly; Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence; Refuge - Canada’s Periodical on Refugees, and European Human Rights 
Law Review. He has written widely on human rights including in:The Irish Times, The 
Guardian and the Times Higher Education Supplement among others. Professor Harvey 
has undertaken funded research for the British Academy, the Nuffield Foundation, Atlantic 
Philanthropies, and the Joseph Rowntree Trust, among others.
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Prof Rory O’Connell, School of Law and Transitional Justice Institute, Ulster University
Rory O’Connell joined the Transitional Justice Institute (TJI) and School of Law in 2013 as 
Professor of Human Rights and Constitutional Law. He was appointed TJI Director from 
2014 to 2020. Rory’s research and teaching interests are in the areas of Human Rights 
and Equality, Constitutional Law and Legal Theory. He has published in the International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, European Law Journal, Legal Studies, European Human 
Rights Law Review and other journals. His books include Applying an International Human 
Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations (Routledge), Human Rights and Public 
Finance (Hart), Legal Theory in the Crucible of Constitutional Justice (Ashgate). His latest 
book Europe, Law and Democracy (Cambridge) will be published in 2020.
He was a member of the project team on the ESRC project ‘Brexit and Northern Ireland: 
The Constitutional, Conflict Transformation, Human Rights and Equality Consequences’ 
#BrexitLawNI. He is a member of the SAFEWATER project funded by the ESPRC.  He is 
also a member of the GCRF Research Hub on Gender, Justice and Security. 
Rory is a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy, and teaches at both undergraduate 
and postgraduate level.
Rory is on the Executive of the Committee on the Administration of Justice and is 
the former editor of the RightsNI Blog.  He has been actively involved in promoting 
international mobility in education: he served as one of the members of the UK team of 
Bologna Experts and was Director of the European Union Funded Intensive Programme 
(IP) on ‘The Borders of Europe’ 2009-2011.
Rory tweets @rjjoconnell and has a website at https://conlawfiles.org/
Prof Aoife O’Donoghue,  Law School, Durham University
Professor O’Donoghue’s research centres on issues related to public international law, 
constitutionalism and feminism with a particular interest in global governance and legal 
theory. Aoife’s work examines constitutionalism, tyranny, utopias and feminism, legal 
theory and international legal history.
Currently, Aoife is heavily engaged with research and policy debates on Brexit with 
a particular focus on Northern Ireland including the ESRC funded project Performing 
Identities: Post-Brexit Northern Ireland and the reshaping of 21st-Century Governance. 
She works with Colin Murray, Sylvia de Mars and Ben TC Warwick on constitutional 
change, including Brexit and repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 on Northern Ireland 
and future constitutional arrangements for the island of Ireland.
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Aoife works on theories of tyranny and tyrannicide and currently writing a CUP 
monograph entitled ‘Tyranny and the Global Legal Order’. Aoife alongside Ruth Houghton 
is developing ideas around feminist utopias, manifestos and global constitutionalism.
With Máiréad Enright of Birmingham Law School and Julie McCandless of Kent Law 
School, Aoife is Co-Director of the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project and is 
embarking on a new project with Máiréad Enright and Liam Thornton to revisit Irish 
constitutional texts.
Aoife worked with Rosa Freedman on the AHRC funded UN Gender Network. Aoife 
was a member of the International Law Association’s working group on due diligence 
and her research on due diligence and international organisations was cited by the 
General Assembly.
Dr Conor O’Mahony Faculty of Law, University College Cork
Dr Conor O’Mahony is a senior lecturer at the School of Law at University College Cork, 
where he teaches and researches in the areas of constitutional law and children’s 
rights. Among other areas of interest, he has written about constitutional amendment 
and referendums both in Ireland and the US in papers in Irish Political Studies, the 
Harvard Human Rights Journal and the Illinois Law Review. He was invited to address 
the Constitutional Convention in 2013 in its deliberations on marriage equality, and the 
Citizens’ Assembly in 2018 in its deliberations on the referendum process. He has also 
been active in media analysis and advocacy during several Irish referendums.
Dr Catherine O’Rourke, School of Law and Transitional Justice Institute, Ulster University
Dr Catherine O’Rourke is Senior Lecturer in the School of Law and Director of the 
Transitional Justice Institute. She researches, teaches and engages in policy work in the 
fields of gender, conflict, transitional justice and international law. As a scholar, she has a 
noted record of publications and research grants. Her research has been supported by 
funders such as the Socio-Legal Studies Association, the Irish government’s Reconciliation 
Fund and the UK’s Department for International Development. Her scholarship has been 
recognized with the Irish Fulbright Scholar Award (2016/17) and the Basil Chubb Prize 
(2010) for the best PhD in politics produced in an Irish university. Catherine holds an 
LLB Law with Politics from Queen’s University Belfast and MSc Gender from the London 
School of Economics. Her PhD, from Ulster University Transitional Justice Institute, 
was subsequently published as a monograph, ‘Gender Politics in Transitional Justice’ 
(Routledge, 2013). Her forthcoming monograph ‘Women’s Rights in Armed Conflict under 
International Law’ will be published with Cambridge University Press in 2019. 
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She works with the Irish and UK governments, the United Nations and several non-
governmental organizations in policy work related to her expertise. She is regularly 
commissioned by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to conduct 
expert research, such as UN Women and the Office of the High Commission on Human 
Rights, and the International Criminal Court Trust Fund for Victims
From February 26th, 2020, Dr O’Rourke will assume the Directorship of TJI.
Eilish Rooney, Transitional Justice Institute and ASPS, Ulster University
Eilish Rooney is an Emeritus Scholar in the School of Applied & Social Policy Sciences 
and at the Transitional Justice Institute (TJI) in the School of Law. Eilish’s research interests 
are in the areas of feminist intersectionality theory; women’s lives in conflict; grassroots 
activism in post-conflict transition and conflict transformation.
She was educated at St Rose’s Secondary School, Belfast, and returned to formal 
education as a mature student at Queen’s University in 1975. Her undergraduate degree 
in English Literature led to postgraduate studies in Jacobean Drama, 1989. From the 
post of culture and politics tutor at the Ulster People’s College, Belfast, she joined Ulster 
University as a lecturer in community studies from 1985 – 2018. She joined the Transitional 
Justice Institute in 2006. Her research and impact contribution was included in Ulster’s 
law submission 2014 when TJI’s research impact was rated 4* (world-leading) and ranked 
first for research impact across UK Law units.
In partnership with the Ashton Trust’s Bridge of Hope, she developed the TJI’s Transitional 
Justice Grassroots Toolkit programme and authored the programme’s toolkit, guide and 
training manual. Other publications include: Justice Dialogue for Grassroots Transition, 
Policy & Practice: A Development Education Review, 2018; International Journal of 
Transitional Justice Special Issue: Transitional Justice from the Margins: Intersections 
of Identities, Power and Human Rights, Oxford, 2018, edited with Fionnuala Ní Aoláin; 
Intersectionality – working in conflict, The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict, 
Oxford University Press, 2018.
She is the Transitional Justice Institute representative on the Women Peace and 
Humanitarian Fund and an intersectionality expert group member of the UN Economic 
and Social Commission for Western Asia.
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Dr Anne Smith, School of Law and Transitional Justice Institute, Ulster University
Anne is a Senior Lecturer  at the Transitional Justice Institute and the School of Law.  
She teaches at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Her research and teaching 
interests are transitional constitutionalism, comparative constitutional law, human rights 
and equality. She has published widely in these areas and is currently writing a book on 
Negotiating Social Justice: The Drafting of Bills of Rights (Hart Publishing, forthcoming). 
Anne’s research has been supported by grants from Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. 
Anne was invited by the Irish Research Council  to act as a  remote reviewer 
for applications to COALESCE Research Fund.
She is a Senior Fellow of HEA and a Fellow member of CHERP, and teaches at both 
undergraduate and postgraduate level. She received the ‘Excellence in Teaching’ 
award (Faculty of Social Sciences category) at Ulster University Students’ Union Awards 
Ceremony in June 2016. Anne read Law and Government at Ulster University and 
graduated with a BA Hons (2:1, first in year). She then graduated at the same university 
with an LLM in European Law and Policy in December 1999. She proceeded to write 
a PhD thesis on Bills of Rights graduating in December 2007 at Ulster University 
receiving an unconditional pass. Anne is an Executive  member of  the Committee on the 
Administration of Justice and is a member of  various organisations such as the British 
Association for Canadian Studies, the UK Constitutional Law Association (UKCLA) and 
the Society of Legal Scholars (SLS). She is also involved in various research networks, 
including the Academic Network on the European Social Charter (ANESC/RACSE) and 
was the co-oordinator for the Economic and Social Rights Academic Network UK and 
Ireland (ESRAN-UKI) from March 2017-November 2018. Anne is also a peer reviewer for 
several journals such as Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law; Nordic Journal 
of International Law; and the Journal of Human Rights.
Dr Silvia Suteu, Faculty of Laws, University College London
Dr Silvia Suteu joined the UCL Faculty of Laws in September 2016. She was previously 
a tutor and ESRC Research Fellow at the University of Edinburgh, where she also co-
founded and convened the Constitutional Law Discussion Group and acted as Associate 
Director for Research Engagement of the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law. Prior 
to that, she held research positions at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights (on the Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project), the Program 
on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University (HPCR), and the 
Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study. She currently also serves as manager of the UK 
Constitutional Law Association Blog.
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Silvia’s current research interests are in comparative constitutional law and constitutional 
theory. She is especially interested in the theory and practice of deliberative constitutional 
change, constitutional entrenchment and democratic theory (in particular eternity clauses), 
transitional constitutionalism, and gender-sensitive constitution-making. She has also 
done work in international humanitarian and human rights law. Silvia has provided legal 
expertise on constitution building to organisations including Democracy Reporting 
International, the Euromed Feminist Initiative, International IDEA and UN Women.
Dr Jane Suiter, Dublin City University, Director of the Institute for Future Media 
and Journalism (FuJo)
Jane is an Associate Professor in the School of Communications at Dublin City University. 
Jane’s expertise lies mainly in the area of the public sphere; and in particular participation 
and political engagement. Her current research focus is on  citizens’ assemblies and on 
disinformation. 
She is co-PI on the Irish Citizen Assembly (2016-2018) and the Irish Constitutional 
Convention (2012-2014) and a founder member of We the Citizens (2011), Ireland’s first 
deliberative experiment. She is a member of the Research Advisory Group on the Scottish 
Citizens’ Assembly. 
She has published in 30 plus journals including Representation, International journal of 
Political Science, Electoral Studies, Politics and the International Journal of Communication 
and is the author of two books including Reimagining Democracy: Lessons in Deliberative 
Democracy from the Irish Frontline published by Cornell University Press. 
Her research is comparative: besides Ireland, her recent projects have included all 
European democracies as well as most of the OECD. Jane is currently PI of PROVENANCE 
a H2020 project tackling disinformation in the social sphere and PI of the Reuters Digital 
News Report (Ireland) and PI of a Marie Curie ETN JOLT on harnessing technology for 
journalism, .
Jane is a Visiting Fellow at the Reuters Institute, Oxford University, communication chair 
of COST ISI308 examining populist political communication and is on the Standing 
Committee of the ECPR standing group on Democratic Innovations.  Jane is a frequent 
contributor to broadcast and print media, has given evidence at parliamentary committees 
and is a former journalist having worked as Economics Editor at The Irish Times and for 
other media such as the FT Group and AP Dow Jones.
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Ciaran White, School of Law, Ulster University
Ciaran White has been a Senior Lecturer in Law at the Law School, Ulster University, 
since 2000, having been a lecturer since 1991, and a Research Assistant in the Queen’s 
University, Belfast before that, from 1990-1991. Educated in University College Cork, 
Queen’s University Belfast and the Honorable Society of King’s Inns, he has academic 
interests in public law, employment law and family law, in which areas of law he has also 
practised at the Northern Ireland Bar since 2003.He has a long-standing interest in issues 
of human rights, discrimination and equality, reflected in some of his publications and 
his activist work in the past and in the present:  for example, he was chair of the CAJ’s 
Racism sub-group that campaigned successfully for the introduction of the Race Relations 
(NI) Order in 1997 and from 2009 until its formal termination in 2016, he was a member of 
the Advisory Group of Disability Action’s, Centre for Human Rights for Disabled Persons.
He is also the author of ‘Northern Ireland Social Work Law’, the primary legal text used 
in the education of social work students and in social work practice in Northern Ireland. 
With strong interests in the leveraging of the legal academic and practice worlds, he 
was Director of the Ulster University Law Clinic, a live client clinic in which law students 
represented public clients in employment and social security tribunals, a first for the island 
of Ireland, from 2012-2016. He also promotes mooting amongst the student body as part 
of this interest.
Alan Whysall, University College London
Alan Whysall has for most of the last 20 years been involved with the Northern Ireland 
peace process as a senior British civil servant in the Northern Ireland Office (with spells in 
the Cabinet Office in London).
He left British Government in summer 2015 and is now Honorary Senior Research 
Associate at the Constitution Unit at University College London.
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Prof Richard Wyn Jones, Director of Cardiff University’s Wales Governance
and Dean of Public Affairs 
Richard Wyn Jones is Director of Cardiff University’s Wales Governance and Dean of 
Public Affairs. He has written extensively on contemporary Welsh politics, devolved 
politics in the UK and nationalism.
Richard was one of the founders of Critical Security Studies and was previously Professor 
of Welsh Politics and founding Director of the Institute of Welsh Politics at the Department 
of International Politics, Aberystwyth University.
Richard is a regular and widely respected broadcaster, commentating on Welsh politics 
in both Welsh and English for the BBC in Wales and across the UK. He has also presented 
two TV series and is a regular columnist for the Welsh language current affairs 
magazine Barn.
Richard is a Fellow of the Learned Society of Wales and the Academy of the Social 
Sciences.
ulster.ac.uk/transitionaljustice
